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THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE1: COPYRIGHT
LAW CONFRONTS THE INFORMATION AGE IN
NEW YORK TIMES V. TASINI2
I. INTRODUCTION
Marshall McLuhan theorized that the medium is the message; that
society is shaped by the way in which we communicate rather than by
what we are communicating.3 The Internet,4 the emerging online
1. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE (Jerome
Agel Coordinator, Bantam Books 1967). See infra note 3.
2. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing publishers to
place freelance articles in electronic databases under the revision privilege in §201(c) of the
Copyright Act), rev’d, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999); Tasini v. New York Times Co., 206 F.3d 161
(2d Cir. 1999) (finding publishers cannot place freelance articles in electronic databases because
databases containing individual articles from periodicals do not constitute revisions under §201(c)),
aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (holding articles
republished in electronic databases are not part of, nor revisions, of periodicals and cannot be relicensed by periodical publishers without the author’s consent).
3. See MCLUHAN, supra note 1 (concluding that since the rise of man, society has been
shaped by the manner in which they communicate). The development of the spoken word allowed
the transfer of ideas among primitive man; the development of the written word allowed records to
be kept and knowledge to be transferred among man’s contemporaries as well as future generations;
Gutenberg’s printing press disseminated the written word to the masses encouraging academia and
debate; the development of telephones and radios drastically reduced geographic barriers to
communication and allowed information to be quickly spread across the globe; and television and
new technologies will transform the world to a “global village” where everyone on the planet is
inextricably connected to each other as if we lived in the same village in primitive Africa. Id.
Throughout these changes, the essence of communications has remained fundamentally the same,
focusing on agriculture, commerce, war, etc., yet society has developed as a result in the changes in
the way that we communicate. Id. See also MARSHALL MCLUHAN & BRUCE R. POWERS, THE
GLOBAL VILLAGE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD LIFE AND MEDIA IN THE 21st CENTURY (Oxford
Univ. Press 1989) (discussing the effects of modern media on society).
4. The Internet began as “ARPANET,” an experimental project of the Advanced Research
Project Agency. Needham J. Boddie et al., A Review of Copyright and the Internet, 20 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 193, 195 (1998). The Defense Advanced Research Agency (DARPA) developed
ARPANET to link computers owned by military contractors with university laboratories conducting
defense related research. Id. As the number of networks increased, DARPA developed rules and
procedures, called protocols, for sending and receiving data within the networks. Id. As the
networks grew in size the networks as a whole came to be known as the “DARPA Internet” which
was subsequently shortened just to Internet. Id. “The Internet today is a worldwide entity whose
nature cannot be easily or simply defined. Id. From a technical definition, the Internet is the set of
all interconnected ‘IP networks’ – the collection of several thousand local, regional, and global
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community, and unprecedented access to information via the
“information superhighway” are confirming McLuhan’s hypothesis.5
Today, it is the norm to have a digital6 telephone in your pocket, not
only capable of instantly contacting anyone in the world, but also
capable of connecting to the Internet to send and receive e-mail,
download stock quotes, and check to see what time a movie is playing.7
Digital communication is revolutionizing the world in which we live.8
computer networks interconnected in real time via the TCP/IP Internetworking Protocol suite. . . .”
DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 16 (McGraw-Hill 1994). More simply,
the Internet is millions of computers in schools, universities, corporations, homes, and other
organizations tied together via telephone lines. David Bruning, Blasting Along the InfoBahn,
ASTRONOMY, June 1995, at 76. “The Internet enables users to share files, search for information,
send electronic mail, and log onto remote computers. But it isn’t a program or even a particular
computer resource. It remains only a means to link computer users together.” Id.
5. See Dom F. Atteritano, Note, The Growing Financial Pie of Online Publications: Tasini’s
New-Use Analysis Leaves Freelance Authors Less than Crumbs, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 378
(1998) (arguing the same). The term “information superhighway” was coined in 1978 by Mr.
Albert Gore, and is used interchangeably with the terms “electronic highway” and “National
Information Infrastructure.” Mark L. Gordon & Diana J. P. McKensie, A Lawyer’s Roadmap of the
Information Superhighway, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 177, 179 (1995). The
“information superhighway” is the popular term used to describe a vision of a worldwide
communications network, similar to what the Internet is today. Id. at 179 n.2 (citing Daniel Pearl,
Colliding Cliches and Other Mishaps on the Term Pike, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1994, at A5). Personal
computers permit instant access to volumes of information from case law, to sports scores, to stock
quotes, to instantaneous breaking news. Atteritano, supra at 378 n.1. Researchers estimate that in
the fourth quarter of 1997, over 62 million people in the U.S. were online and taking advantage of
this new technology. Id. at n.5. As a result, the United States is amidst unprecedented
technological change in which our capacity to produce, transmit, and receive information increases
daily. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 1.1, at 1 (3d ed. 1999).
6. Digital technology can transfer and express text, audio and visual information extremely
effectively using bits of data. See Rod Dixon, Profits in Cyberspace: Should Newspaper and
Magazine Publishers Pay Freelance Writers for Digital Content? 4 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L.
REV. 127, 127 n.1 (1997) (citing PETER NORTON, INSIDE THE P.C. at 319-20 (6th ed. 1995)); Sony
Media and Energy – Digital Future, available at http://www.sel.sony.com/SEL/rmeg/digitalfuture/
(last visited October 1, 2001). Bits, expressed as either a “1” or a “0”, are the fundamental units of
digital technological data. Id. The bits “1” and “0” represent on and off switches which allow
electrical current to pass through the memory register of a computer or microchip. Id. Since binary
bits enable easy digital expression and as digital technology expands the amount of data that can be
processed on a microchip, digital format has become the format of choice in electronics. Id.
7. Techno Life, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 1, 1997, at 68. Digital wireless telephones
are actually computers that can access the Internet, send and receive electronic mail, download
sports scores in real time, and transmit faxes. Id. E-mail, short for electronic mail, is a method of
communication via the Internet whereby one can address and transmit a message to one or more
people. Boddie, supra note 4, at 195.
8. See Atteritano, supra note 5, at 378 (discussing the impact of digital technology); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Super Highway”: Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright
in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1467 (1995) (arguing digital technology makes it easy to
make perfect digital copies of works, but copyright law is flexible enough to adequately cope with
these new technologies); Sheldon W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of
Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 571 (2001) (arguing the digital information infrastructure
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Unfortunately the technological revolution has sparked a civil war
within copyright law.9 Congress has periodically, but consistently,
modified the copyright laws to respond to the introduction of new
technologies affecting copyright.10 Although Congress passed the
Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter Copyright Act or 1976 Act) to cope
with emerging computer technology, no one anticipated the explosion of
digital technology that has marked the dawning of the Information
Age.11
The overriding purpose of copyright law is “to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.”12 To achieve this purpose
makes private infringement easier and detection more difficult thereby making individual standards
of moral and ethical conduct more important in copyright law); Dixon, supra note 6, at 127
(discussing applicability of traditional copyright principles to new digital formats in which society
receives information); April M. Major, Copyright Law Tackles Yet Another Challenge: The
Electronic Frontier of the World Wide Web, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 75, 76 (1998)
(discussing how digital technology enables almost anyone to be a publisher); John D. Shuff &
Gregory T. Holtz, Copyright Tensions in a Digital Age, 34 AKRON L. REV. 555, 557 (2001)
(discussing benefits of new technologies); David J. Loundy, Revising the Copyright Law for
Electronic Publishing, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 4 (1995) (discussing effect of
digital technology on individuals, libraries, the publishing industry, and copyright law).
9. See Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see also supra note 8 (examining impact of digital technology
on society); infra notes 12-17 (examining impact of digital technology on copyright law).
10. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) (“From its
beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology. . .
Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this country, it has been Congress that has
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary. . .”); Robert Meitus, Interpreting the
Copyright Act’s Section 201(c) Revision Privilege with Respect to Electronic Media, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 749, 753 (2000); Arthur Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs,
Databases and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV.
977, 982 (1993); text infra note 35. When technological change renders the terms of the Copyright
Act ambiguous, the Court must construe the Copyright Act to further its underlying purpose; to
maximize the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors. Twentieth Cent.
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932) (asserting the sole interest of the United States in copyright is benefiting the public); see also
Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327 (1858) (stating the ultimate aim of granting a limited
monopoly to authors is to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good); Grant v.
Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241 (1832) (arguing that conferring benefit on the public via creative works
is primary purpose of copyright).
11. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2002). “Many decades of technological,
social and economic changes forced Congress to amend the 1909 Act in a piecemeal fashion. But in
1955, Congress authorized comprehensive hearings and reports that culminated – nearly twenty
years later – in the 1976 Act.” Meitus, supra note 10, at 754. The 1976 Copyright Act provides
protection to all works fixed in a tangible medium of expression regardless of whether it was
published; extends copyright protection to the life of the author plus seventy years; guarantees
copyright owners five exclusive rights including reproduction, adaptation, public distribution,
performance, and display; and allows copyright owners to license or assign the copyright in whole
or in part getting rid of indivisibility. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress “the Power . . . to
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to authors and
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authors are granted a limited monopoly in their works as an economic
incentive to create and disseminate their works.13 This incentive to the
authors competes against the fact that to promote the general welfare, the
public must also have access to the new works.14 The author’s
monopoly inherently restricts access to the works, but absent this limited
monopoly there would be little incentive to create and thus fewer works
to access.15 Copyright law delicately balances these competing interests
to foster the creation and dissemination of literary and artistic works in
order to enhance the public’s access to “science and the useful arts.”16
Digital technology has upset the delicate balance of copyright law
by increasing society’s access to authors’ works via the Internet, and by
enabling society to make perfect digital copies of those works.17 Under
the new digital regime, it is increasingly more difficult for authors to
enforce their copyrights; while for the first time it is economically
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . .” Id. See also,
Twentieth Cent. Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156 (discussing purposes of copyright law); Fox Film
Corp., 286 U.S. at 127 (noting purpose of copyright); Kendall, 62 U.S. at 328 (stating purposes of
copyright); Grant, 31 U.S. at 241 (discussing underlying purposes of copyright law).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also, infra text, at notes 35-38 (looking at history of
copyright law).
14. Dixon, supra note 6, at 140 (“. . .Courts must balance the constitutionally competing aims
of promoting human creativity and original expression through strict enforcement of the copyright
law with ensuring that broad copyright protections do not unfairly or unnecessarily prevent the
development of our knowledge base – particularly, the nation’s development of practical uses of
technology and information”).
15. See infra note 37 (discussing incentives created by copyright system).
16. Shuff, supra note 8, at 556. (stating the various copyright statutes enacted over the past
210 years have attempted to equalize the tensions by providing a sufficient incentive to ensure that
new works are created while allowing for the broadest public consumption of those works). It is a
delicate balance that has shifted over the years to offer greater or lesser protections under the
various statutes to achieve the same goals of benefiting the public. Id.; see Pamela Samuelson, Fair
Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of
Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1 J. INTEL. PROP. L. 49, 57 (1993).
17. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 285 (1996) (arguing digital technology threatens to upset copyright’s balance of private
ownership and public access because once a work is online anyone, can make perfect digital copies,
can make limitless variations, and can disseminate them to the ends of the earth); Halpern, supra
note 8, at 597 (“The digital technology of recent years has significantly upset what was always a
precarious balance and it is likely that further refinements to that technology will give rise to even
more serious disruption.”); Shuff, supra note 8, at 555 (“The rapid and exponential expansion of our
ability to duplicate and disseminate information by digital means has rejuvenated inherent tensions
in the law pertaining to copyright and has created some new ones.”). Cf. Am. Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (1994) (“. . . widespread availability of photocopying technology
threatens to disrupt the delicate balances established by the Copyright Act.”), cert. dismissed, 116
S.Ct. 592 (1995). Reproduction technologies create a pressing need for “the law to strike an
appropriate balance between the authors’ interest in preserving the integrity of copyright, and the
public’s right to enjoy the benefits that [the new technology] offers.” Id., citing 3 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2001).
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feasible for publishers and the public to make and sell individual
infringing copies of a work.18 The characteristics of digital technology
are changing the underlying assumptions of copyright law and leaving
authors, publishers, and users confused as to their rights.19
Copyright law finally confronted the Information Age in New York
Times Co. v. Tasini20 when the Supreme Court applied copyright law to
electronic publishing for the first time.21 The plaintiffs, six freelance
writers, argued that the defendant print publishers infringed their
copyrights by placing their freelance articles in electronic databases
without the author’s permission.22 The defendants admit placing the
articles in the electronic databases without permission, but they claim a
privilege to republish the articles as part of a “revision” under §201(c) of
the Copyright Act.23 The Supreme Court held that the articles
republished in the electronic databases were not “part of” nor “revisions
of” the original periodicals because they were presented individually.24
Therefore, the freelance articles could not be re-licensed or re-published
electronically by the print publishers without the author’s consent.25
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in New
York Times Co. v. Tasini and its implications for the future of copyright
law and electronic publishing.26 Part II of this Note documents the
background of copyright law, and details how the default provisions of
18. Shuff, supra note 8, at 557. (explainging digital technology’s “astonishingly low
threshold of capitalization and technical expertise” allows copying and dissemination at the stroke
of a key). “The information infrastructure makes private infringement of intellectual property rights
vastly easier to carry out and correspondingly more difficult to detect and prevent.” Halpern, supra
note 8, at 572, citing Comm. on Intell. Prop. Rights and the Emerging Info. Infrastructure, Nat’l
Research Council, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information Age, at ix (2000)
(executive summary reprinted in 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 951 (2001)). The National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (hereinafter CONTU) concluded that where the cost of
duplication is low, copies are more likely to be made; where more copies are likely to be made,
legal protection is needed to preserve the incentive to create and disseminate the works that are
being copied. Nat’l Comm. on New Tech. Uses of Copyrighted Works 7 (1979).
19. Halpern, supra note 8, at 597 (arguing that the nature of modern copyright law obstructs
the underlying purposes and fails to give society an unambiguous moral compass). The actions of
the average citizen on the Internet regularly violate copyright laws by downloading files, yet society
merely thinks of these violations as mala prohibita crimes without a victim. Id. at 572.
20. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483.
21. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 483. The Supreme Court decided in favor of the freelance authors in
answering the long awaited question of who owns electronic rights to freelance articles. Laurie A.
Santelli, Note, New Battles Between Freelance Authors and Publishers in the Aftermath of Tasini v.
New York Times, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 253, 254 (1998).
22. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 487.
23. Id.; 17 U.S.C. §201(c) (2002).
24. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 483.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see infra Part II-V.
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§201(c) govern the publisher-author relationship.27 Part III of this Note
introduces the parties and circumstances surrounding the Tasini case.28
Part III continues by outlining the District Court for the Southern
District of New York,29 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,30
and the Supreme Court decisions in this landmark case.31 Part IV of this
Note dissects the Supreme Court’s interpretation of §201(c)’s “revision”
privilege and its application to electronic databases.32 Lastly, Part V of
this Note discusses the consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision
and the potential effect it will have on electronic publishing and
society.33
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Copyright Law
Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press marked the beginning
of the mass production of literary works34 and, consequently, the need
for copyright protection.35 Copyright laws developed in an effort to
balance an author’s right to his creative works with the public’s interest
in having access to those works.36 Copyright law aims to achieve this
balance by granting authors exclusive rights in their works so as to
encourage them to both create and disseminate their works for the public

27. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002); infra Part II.
28. See Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; infra Part III.
29. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. 804; infra Part III.
30. See Tasini, 206 F.3d 161; infra Part III.
31. See Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; infra Part III.
32. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see 17 U.S.C. §201(c) (2002); infra Part IV.
33. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see infra Part V.
34. “Literary works are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are
embodied.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). This includes computer program, computer databases and all
digital works. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976).
35. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984)
(discussing how copyright protection was not necessary prior to the printing press because hand
copying literary works was too costly and time consuming to pose a threat to authors’ interests).
See also Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Author’s Rights in a Digital Age, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 3
(1995) (examining history of copyright law); Yuri Hur, Note, Tasini v. New York Times:
Ownership of Electronic Copyrights Rightfully Returned to Authors, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 65
(2000) (discussing development of copyright law).
36. Santelli, supra note 21, at 258 (explaining how England passed the Statute of Anne, the
first copyright statute, in 1710 granting authors the exclusive right to copy their books for fourteen
years). The book then became part of the public domain for the public’s benefit. Id.
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good.37 The Supreme Court acknowledged, “[e]ncouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through talents of authors and inventors in ‘science and the
useful arts.’”38
The United States Constitution embodies these ideals by giving
Congress “the Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”39
Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress has passed numerous
comprehensive copyright statutes,40 the most recent being the Copyright
Act of 1976.41
Under the 1976 Act, copyrights are granted to original works of
authorship in any fixed, tangible medium of expression.42 The author of
37. Boddie, supra note 4, at 215 (discussing the fundamental purpose of copyright law is to
encourage individuals to produce and disseminate creative works to the public). By providing
authors with exclusive rights to their works, they will not fear the theft of their work hence
promoting dissemination. Id. Additionally, these exclusive rights provide an economic incentive to
produce new works because the authors can reap the benefits of their efforts. Id. See also, 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002).
38. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
40. Meitus, supra note 10, at 753 (discussing how Congress passed the first federal copyright
statute in 1790 granting protection to maps, charts, or books for fourteen years with an equal
renewal period). General revisions took place in 1831 and 1870. Id. In 1909 Congress overhauled
the old copyright statute and adopted the 1909 Act which: expanded the subject matter of
copyrights; extended the duration of copyrights, and changed the trigger for federal protection to
publication instead of registration. Id. The 1909 Act was amended throughout the twentieth
century to meet social and technological changes, but in 1955 Congress authorized comprehensive
hearings and reports that culminated in the Copyright Act. Id. See also Michael Spink, Authors
Stripped of Their Electronic Rights In Tasini v. New York Times Co., 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
409, 418 (1999) (laying out progression of United States’ copyright laws).
41. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (2002). The 1976 Act provides protection
to all “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2002) (stating subject matter of
copyright). A work is fixed when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecords is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002) (defining “fixed”). The 1976 Act
does not require the work to be published in order to be protection. See id. It extended the duration
of protection to the life of the author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2002). The 1976 Act
guarantees authors five exclusive rights: reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, performance,
and display. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). It also allows for divisibility of a copyright through licensing
of a copyright in whole or in part. Meitus, supra note 10, at 754.
42. Frank H. Smith, Tasini v. New York Times Co.: A Copyright, or a Right to Copy?, 32
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1998). Under the 1976 Act, Congress has the power to grant a
copyright “in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2002). There are two basic
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the work is the original owner of the copyright.43 The copyright owner
is granted a bundle of exclusive rights including the right to reproduce
the work, distribute copies, create derivative works, publicly perform the
work, and display the work.44 Each exclusive right is divisible from the

requirements for copyright protection: originality and fixation. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2002); Jack
B. Hicks, Note, Copyright and Computer Databases: Is Traditional Compilation Law Adequate?,
65 TEX. L. REV. 993, 997 (1987). The originality requirement stems from the Court’s interpretation
of “author” to mean “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; or maker.” Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (holding arrangement of photographic subject
sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection), noted in Hicks, supra at 997. To meet this
low threshold standard the author must contribute something more than a trivial variation; the work
must be independently created, not copied, and possesses a minimal degree of creativity. BurrowGiles Lithographic, 111 U.S. at 53 (holding photographic layout and set design sufficiently original
for copyright protection); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)
(holding advertisements “in their ensemble and in all their details, in their design and particular
combinations of figures, lines and colors, are the original work of the plaintiffs’ designer”); Feist
Publn’s Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding listing names alphabetically in
telephone directory was not sufficiently original to grant copyright protection). Creativity is usually
only an issue when the object of copyright is short and is mainly functional. Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (inferring some modicum of creativity is required when the
Court defined a “writing” as “any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic
labor”), quoted in Hicks, supra, at 998; Smith v. George E. Muelebach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp.
729 (W.D. Mo. 1956) (holding a two note musical composition “too simple” for copyright). The
fixation requirement means a work must be more than an idea, procedure, process, system, concept,
or discovery; it must be an expression of that idea in a tangible form. Hicks, supra, at 999; see
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (holding photograph falls under copyright law’s protection of
fixed writings).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994) (discussing how generally the author is the party who actually
creates the work, the party who translates the idea into a fixed, tangible medium of expression).
However, the 1976 Act contains an exception whereby “If the work is for hire, ‘the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author,’ and consequently they own
the copyright, not the creator.” Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737
(1989) (holding independent sculptor was not an employee of organization who hired him to make
statue, thus the statue was not a work made for hire), citing 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2002). In deciding
if a work is made for hire, a court must first use principles of the general common law of agency to
determine whether an employee or an independent contractor made the work. Reid, 490 U.S. at
751. If a work was made by an employee, the court applies § 101(1) which states, “A ‘work for
hire’ is a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.” 17 U.S.C. §
101(1) (defining work made for hire). If a work was created by an independent contractor, the court
can apply § 101(2) that allows the parties to expressly agree in a written instrument that a work is
“made for hire” only if the work is, “specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to
a collective work, as part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a
test, or as an atlas.” Reid, 490 U.S. at 751; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (defining “work made for
hire”). The “work made for hire” doctrine is very important to freelance creators because it
determines to which works they own copyrights, and to which works their patrons hold the
copyrights. Reid, 490 U.S. at 737.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990) (referring to
copyright owner’s exclusive rights as a bundle of rights in their work).
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others and, therefore, independently transferable.45 A transfer of one or
all of these exclusive rights is valid only if conveyed in writing and
signed by the copyright owner.46
B. Authors, Publishers, and Collective Works
A collective work is a work, such as a periodical, newspaper, or
anthology, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independently copyrightable works, are assembled into a collective
whole.47 “Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is
distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests
initially in the author of the contribution.”48 Copyright in the collective
work as a whole vests in the collective author and only covers the
creative material added by that author, not the preexisting material.49
45. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2002). The copyright owner may transfer any exclusive rights
individually while retaining ownership of the remaining exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2)
(2002). Any one of the exclusive rights may be transferred and owned separately. Id.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2002).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002) (defining “collective work”). A collective work is a type of
compilation. Id. A compilation is “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work
as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” Id. (defining compilation). A compilation
may be made of previously copyrighted works or of works/data that is not copyrightable standing
alone. Hicks, supra note 42, at 1001.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2002) (“Copyright in a compilation or derivative extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such a work, as distinguished from the preexisting material
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The
copyright in such work is independent of and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration,
ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting work.”). A magazine
publisher has a copyright in the magazine as a collective work, but photographers, advertisers, and
freelance writers have separate copyrights in the independent pictures and articles contributed to the
magazine. Wendy J. Gordon, Fine Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic Distribution and
Reproduction, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 473, 479 (2000). Thus a party wishing to copy a magazine must
get permission from the copyright owner of the collective work (publisher), and from each of the
owners of the copyrights in the individual articles, advertisements, and photographs. Id.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2002); see supra note 20. Authors of compilations are deemed to
contribute originality through selection, coordination and arrangement of the underlying facts or
works, thus only granting them copyright protection to these aspects of the compilation. See 17
U.S.C § 101 (2002) (defining compilation); Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
341 (1991) (holding telephone directory not copyrightable because selection was mandated by state
law, and alphabetical arrangement was not original). For compilations of preexisting material, the
arrangement is often the only contribution of the compiler. Hicks, supra note 42, at 1002, citing
Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 958
(1966); Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937); PIC Design Corp. V. Sterling Precision
Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15
F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 738 (1926). “Under the arrangement doctrine, if an
original (non copied) arrangement of information is chosen and the required quantity of intellectual
labor is expended, copyright is deserved.” Hicks, supra note 42, at 1002. Subjective selection of
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Prior to the 1976 Act, freelance authors risked losing their
copyrights when their articles were included in collective works such as
newspapers.50 The 1976 Act addressed this unfair situation so as to
preserve an author’s rights when he placed his works in compilations.51
The 1976 Act recast copyright as an exclusive bundle of rights, each of
which could be exclusively transferred or owned.52 When an author
includes an article in a collective work, “the owner of copyright in the
collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of
what to gather, and what to include in a compilation is another form of copyrightable expression
found in compilations. Id. at 1005. “The creative effort involved in selecting and compiling such
material satisfies copyright’s requirement of originality and creativity.” Id., citing Eckes v. Card
Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984); Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to
Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1942); College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119
F.2d 874, 875 (2d Cir. 1941); Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
However, compilations substantially similar to the original are not copyrightable. Hicks, supra note
42, at 1006. Subjective selection is usually only applied to small compilations because the compiler
has narrowed the wide range of possible subjects down to a few select components of the
compilation. Id. Compilations based on objective criteria, such as all telephone numbers in a state,
are not protected under the subjective selection doctrine. Id.
50. See Matthew Hoff, Tasini v. New York Times: What the Second Circuit Didn’t Say, 10
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 125, 132 (1999) (discussing the same). Under the 1909 Copyright Act, a
copyright was a single, indivisible right. Id. Since there was no partial assignment of copyright,
any transfer had to be either a complete transfer of rights, or a mere license. Id. The 1909 Act
required copyright notice in the name of the copyright proprietor in order to protect the work. Id.
Since a licensee was not a proprietor, the publisher’s copyright notice did not protect freelance
writers’ articles included in collective works. Id. The freelance authors were left with two
unacceptable choices: 1) license their articles to be published in a collective work (hoping the
publisher might include a separate copyright notice without which the article would fall into the
public domain), or 2) transfer the whole copyright to the publisher, thus making him the proprietor
and protecting the article (but the author has lost all future rights in the work). Id., at 133. Since
publishers rarely included separate copyright notices for contributions, the authors were stuck with
transferring the whole copyright or losing their work to the public domain. Hoff, supra, at 33.
Known as the “Doctrine of Indivisibility,” this scheme often led to authors losing all of the rights to
their works when they did not intend that result. Id., at 134. In addition, under the 1909 Act, an
author could not sue a third party for infringement if they had previously licensed a publisher to use
the work. Id.
51. Hoff, supra note 50, at 134 (discussing how the Doctrine of Indivisibility was widely
criticized as being unfair to authors, so courts began to erode the Doctrine). Goodis v. United
Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 399 (2d. Cir. 1970) (holding an author’s work did not fall
into the public domain as long as there was a copyright notice on the work, even if it was in the
publisher’s name). The Doctrine of Indivisibility was finally killed by the passage of the Copyright
Act of 1976 which recognized copyright as a bundle of divisible, exclusive rights. Hoff, supra note
50, at 132. An author could now assign certain rights to a publisher and retain the others to possibly
assign in the future. Id.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002) (owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to do and authorize
any of the following: to reproduce, to prepare derivative works, to distribute, to perform, and to
display); 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2002) (“[t]he ownership of copyright may be transferred in whole or
in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass
as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.”).
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reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that collective
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work
in the same series.”53 The 1976 Act also provides that a single copyright
notice, applicable to the collective work as a whole, is sufficient to
protect the rights of freelance authors in their contributions.54 Today,
copyright law allows freelance authors to resell their articles after their
initial publication, thus allowing them to benefit from future demand for
their contributions standing alone or in a new collection.55 Taken as a
whole, the Copyright Act was designed to preserve the author’s
copyright in his contribution to a collective work.56
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
Six freelance authors brought suit against print and electronic
53. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002) (emphasis added). Owners of copyrights in collective works
have a different right than the copyright owner of a contributed article. Charles S. Sims & Matthew
J. Morris, Tasini and Archival Electronic Publication Rights of Newspapers and Magazines, 18
COMM. LAW. 9, 10 (2001). “The extent of these differing rights for authors and publishers depends
on the construction of §201(c).” Id. The authors argue §201(c) grants no rights but only a privilege,
a non-exclusive and non-transferable license to print each article in the original issue of the
periodical and in later versions, limited to the original medium of publication. Id. The publishers
argue that it is a limited right, which is transferable to other mediums or other parties. Id.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 404(a) (2002) (“Notice of Copyright: . . . A separate contribution to a
collective work may bear its own notice of copyright, . . . [h]owever, a single notice applicable to
the collective work as a whole is sufficient to invoke the provisions of section 401(d) or 402(d) . . .
regardless of the ownership of the copyright in the contributions and whether they have been
previously published.”). Previously, a single copyright notice on a collective work did not protect
the contributing freelance author’s works because the publisher’s notice only applied to works
owned by the publisher, therefore licensed works were published without copyright notice and fell
into the public domain. Goodis, 425 F.2d at 400.
55. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 497, citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,
229 (1990) (“when an author produces a work which later commands a higher price in the market
than the original bargain provided, the copyright statute is designed to provide the author the power
to negotiate for the realized value of the work.”).
56. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659. The House
of Representatives Report explains:
The second sentence of section 201(c), in conjunction with the provisions of section 404
dealing with copyright notice, will preserve the author’s copyright in a contribution even
if the contribution does not bear a separate notice in the author’s own name, and without
requiring any unqualified transfer of rights to the owner of the collective work. This is
coupled with a presumption that unless there has been an express transfer of more, the
owner of the collective work acquires ‘only the privilege of reproducing and distributing
the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective
work, and any later collective work in the same series.
Id.
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publishers for copyright infringement when, without express
authorization, their articles were included in electronic databases.57 The
plaintiffs in this case were freelance writers who had sold articles to the
defendant newspapers and magazines for publication.58 The defendant
print publishers, New York Times Co. (NY Times), Newsday, Inc.
(Newsday) and Time, Inc. (Time) engaged the authors as independent
contractors through contracts and oral licenses that did not secure the
authors’ consent to place the articles in an electronic database.59 The
defendant print publishers then licensed the electronic defendants,
LEXIS/NEXIS (NEXIS) and University Microfilms International
(UMI), to copy and sell the articles via their electronic databases.60
NEXIS produces an online database that allows subscribers to
access the full-text of any article in their database via a search engine.61
UMI produces the “N.Y. Times OnDisc” CD-ROM (NYTO) that allows
users to search and retrieve full-text articles from past editions of the
57. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 806 (1997).
58. Id. (discussing how the original Plaintiffs were eleven freelance writers and photographers
who contributed to the collective works of the print publisher defendants). Only six plaintiffs
remained when the district court granted summary judgment including: Jonathon Tasini, Mary Kay
Blakley, Barbara Garson, Margot Mifflin, Sonia Jaffe Robbins, and David S. Whitford. Id.
Jonathon Tasini is the President of the National Writers Union Local 1981. See Patrick O’Connor,
Online Computer Databases and CD-ROMs are not the Electronic Equivalent of Microfilm: Tasini
v. New York Times Co., Electronic Revisions and Individual Contributions to Collective Works
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 521, 524 (1998). The National Writers
Union represents the interests of approximately 4,500 freelance journalists, book authors, poets,
technical writers and editorial cartoonists, and funded the plaintiff’s action against the print and
electronic publishers. Id.
59. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 809 (discussing how the defendants asserted they had acquired
express transfer of the freelancer’s rights in the articles, but the district court concluded that no such
transfer had taken place). It is also important to note the significance of the authors acting as
independent contractors rather than as employees because a work “prepared by an employee within
the scope of his or her employment” is a “work made for hire”. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). Under the
Copyright Act, the employer acquires the copyright in any “work made for hire”, thus if an author is
an employee, they do not retain any rights in their works. Id. at § 201(b); See also Hur, supra note
35 (examining “work made for hire” doctrine).
60. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 489 (discussing how each print publisher had an agreement with
LEXIS/NEXIS where they provided NEXIS with all the individual articles from their print
periodicals). The license authorized NEXIS to copy or sell any portion of those texts. Id.
61. Id. at 490 (describing NEXIS’s services). The print publishers and NEXIS place
additional coding in each article to facilitate retrieval from the central database. Id. Subscribers can
then search for articles by author, subject, date, publication, headline, key term words in text, or
other criteria. Id. The subscriber can then view, download or print the articles that match his search
criteria. Id. Each article is displayed with a header informing the reader of the original print
publication, date, section, initial page number, headline or title, and author. Id. Each article is
displayed independently without any visible link to other articles from the original periodical. Id.
The results are in a text-only format where pictures, advertisements, and original formatting features
such as font, page placement, and location of continuation pages are lost. Id.
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New York Times similar to the NEXIS database.62 UMI also produces
the “General Periodicals OnDisc” CD-ROM (GPO) that contains
selected New York Times articles along with thousands of other
articles.63 GPO presents the New York Times Book Review and
Magazine sections as image-based files that show the entire page of the
periodical in context, rather than just the text of the article like NEXIS
and NYTO.64
The plaintiffs brought suit in the Southern District of New York
claiming that by providing the articles to the electronic databases, the
defendant publishers infringed the plaintiffs’ copyrights in the articles
they had licensed to the publishers.65 The defendants contend they are
privileged under §201(c) of the 1976 Act to reproduce and distribute the
individual works in “any revision of that collective work.”66 The crux of
this case is therefore the Supreme Court’s legal definition of the term
“revision,” or more precisely, whether the electronic databases are
permissible “revisions” of the individual periodical from which the
articles were taken.67
B. The District Court for the Southern District of New York68
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants holding §201(c) shielded the defendant publishers from
liability because the electronic databases were permissible “revisions” of

62. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 490 (describing UMI’s business). NYTO is a text-only system much
like the NEXIS database where a header is added but most of the original formatting is lost. Id.
63. Id. (discussing how New York Times licensed GPO to provide a facsimile of the NY
Times Sunday Book Review and Magazine). UMI “burns” the image of the periodical page onto
the GPO CD-ROM so an article appears exactly as it appears on the printed page, complete with
photographs, captions, advertisements, and other formatting. Id. GPO also contains articles from
approximately 200 additional publications. Id. The CD-ROMs are searched in the same manner as
the NEXIS database, and may be viewed, downloaded or printed. Id.
64. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 491; see also, supra note 61 (setting forth how electronic databases
function).
65. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
66. Id. “In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the
owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of
reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular work, any revision of that
collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.” (emphasis added). 17 U.S.C. §
201(c) (1994).
67. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499 (describing the same). Webster’s defines “revision” as “1. the
act, process, or work of revising; review; re-examination for correction; as, the revision of a book or
of a proof sheet; a revision of statutes. 2. the result of revising; a revised form or version, as of a
book, manuscript, etc.” WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1552 (2d ed.
1983).
68. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. 804.
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the original periodicals.69 First, the court rejected two of the defendants’
claims that some plaintiffs expressly transferred their electronic rights.70
Next, the court found their § 201(c)’s “revision” privilege was
transferable, included display rights, and need not be in the same
medium as the original.71 Finally, the court held that the electronic
databases “reproduced and distributed” the author’s works “as part
of . . . [a] revision of that collective work” to which the authors had
originally contributed.72
69. Id. (discussing the District Courts reasoning). Summary Judgment is required when
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of informing the
court of the basis of its motion and identifying the matter it believes demonstrates the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once a party satisfies
its initial burden, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). The court must resolve any factual ambiguities in favor of the
nonmovant. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. 804, 810, citing McNeil v. Aguilos, 831 F. Supp. 1079, 1082
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
70. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 810 (discussing how Newsday and Sports Illustrated claimed that
some plaintiffs expressly transferred their electronic rights to the print publishers). Section 204(a)
of the Copyright Act states “a transfer of copyright ownership . . . is not valid unless an instrument
or conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of
the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.” 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2002). Newsday
asserted the checks used to pay plaintiffs had an agreement on the back that, if cashed, granted
Newsday the “right to include [plaintiff’s articles] in electronic library archives.” Tasini, 972 F.
Supp. at 810. The district court noted: 1) there was no prior agreement or mutual consent
concerning the electronic rights (i.e. articles were published before authors received checks), 2) the
legends were ambiguous and don’t reflect an express transfer of electronic rights, and 3) archives
and “electronic libraries”, one of which Newsday maintained itself, do not include selling the
articles to a commercial database such as NEXIS. Id. at 810-11. Sports Illustrated claimed they had
the right to publish the articles in electronic form under Section 10(a) of its contracts that granted
them the right “first to publish”. Id. However, the court rejected this claim because the articles
were “first” published in print forty-five days prior to them being published electronically. Id. at
812. The district court could not find that any of the plaintiffs expressly transferred electronic rights
in their articles. Id.
71. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 815 (discussing how the district court reasoned it was permissible
for the print defendants to transfer the § 201(c) privilege to the electronic defendants because “the
aim of § 201(c)—to avoid the unfairness of indivisibility—would not be further served” by making
the privilege non-transferable). Rather the court treated the privilege as a divisible portion of
copyright that could be individually and separately transferred. Id. Further, the court found no
support for the plaintiff’s claim that the legislative history of § 201(c) only intended to allow
revisions and reproductions in the same medium as the original. Id. The court noted, and both
parties conceded, that microfilm archives of newspapers are acceptable “revisions” under § 201(c)
although they are in a different medium. Id. Lastly, the court held although § 201(c) only grants
the right to reproduce the work as a revision, it implicitly includes the right to display the work
since a work cannot be displayed electronically without being displayed on a screen. Id. at 816.
72. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 806; see 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). The defendants are only permitted to
place plaintiff’s articles into revisions of those collective works in which the articles first appeared,
not “new anthologies” or “entirely different magazines or other collective works.” Tasini, 972 F.
Supp. at 806, citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 122 (1976). Compilations and collective works, such
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The district court used a two-step analysis to determine whether the
databases qualified as “revisions.”73 First, the district court identified
the distinguishing characteristics that rendered the defendant’s collective
work original.74
Second, the court determined whether these
characteristics were preserved in the alleged revision, or rather whether
the two works were “substantially similar.”75 The district court found
the databases preserved the print publishers’ “selection” of articles by
including all of the articles originally assembled by the print
publishers.76 Additionally, the databases “highlighted the connection
as defendant’s periodicals, are characterized by the fact that they have relatively little originality,
thus if defendants change the original selection and arrangement of their newspapers, they are at
risk of creating new works no longer recognizable as versions of the original periodicals. Id. When
“revising” their periodicals, defendants must preserve some significant original aspect of those
original works, whether selection or arrangement, in order to satisfy the requirements of § 201(c).
Id. The district court concluded that “it is only if such distinguishing original characteristic remains
that the resulting creation can fairly be termed a revision of that collective work which preceded it.”
Id. at 821.
73. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 821 (discussing the same). The court’s two-step analysis is
derived from the “substantial similarity” test used for determining infringement of collective works.
Id. at 822. In determining infringement of collective works, “courts begin by determining whether
the plaintiff’s compilation exhibits sufficient originality to merit protection; if there is sufficient
originality in either selection or arrangement, it is necessary to determine whether these original
elements have been copied into the allegedly infringing work.” Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 821. A
defendant infringes the Plaintiff’s copyright when he copies the original aspects of a protected
collective work so extensively so as to render the “offending and copyrighted works substantially
similar.” Id., citing Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Intern. Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir.
1995). The district court reasoned that the current case should use this test reciprocally whereby if
the original selection or arrangement of materials is preserved, the electronic reproductions are
permissible revisions of “that collective work”. Id. at 822. But, if the original aspects of selection
or arrangement are not preserved, the electronic reproductions are impermissibly exploiting
plaintiff’s rights in the underlying works. Id.
74. Id. at 821. The factors for originality are derived from the Copyright Act’s definition of a
“compilation”, it is a work formed by the collection and assembly of preexisting materials or of data
that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship” (emphasis added). 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002); Feist
Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (concluding most compilations
reflect sufficient originality in selection and arrangement to merit copyright protection, but not
every selection, coordination, or arrangement will” be sufficiently original, i.e. alphabetical order).
75. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 823. A subsequent work must preserve more than a “certain
percentage” of the original selection of materials. Id., citing Worth v. Selchow & Richter Co., 827
F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding defendants trivia game did not copy selection of facts from
trivia book because game only used a fraction of those facts). The subsequent work must not differ
in selection by “more than a trivial degree” from the earlier work. Id., citing Kregos v. Associated
Press, 937 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding copying six of nine statistic categories is not
infringement). The district court did not focus on what was different between the two works, but
rather focused on what the publishers retained in their alleged revisions. Id. at 824.
76. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 823 (discussing the same). The court reasoned that a defining
element of the defendant’s publications is the selection of the articles included in those works. Id.
The New York Times, in identifying “all the news that’s fit to print,” performs a highly subjective
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between plaintiff’s article and the hard copy periodicals” in tags that
identify the article’s original location in a particular publication.77 Thus,
the electronic databases were deemed “revision[s]” under §201(c)
because they contained “recognizable versions of the publishers’
newspapers and magazines.”78
The district court denied the freelance authors’ motion for
reconsideration in an opinion clarifying its previous opinion.79
C. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit80
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision.81 The Second Circuit rejected the district court’s analysis by
recognizing the databases do almost nothing to preserve the

selection process that actually defines the character of the paper and distinguishes it from others. Id.
The print publisher’s selection is preserved electronically because the articles would not have
appeared online had it not been for their selection to be in the New York Times, and the print
publisher’s entire selection of articles is included in the electronic databases. Id.
77. Id. at 824 (discussing the same). The district court noted that the electronic databases
repeatedly identify the publication from which each article was taken thus enhancing the value of
that article. Id. An article “tagged” as from the New York Times “is instantly imbued with a
certain degree of credibility that might not exist in the case of an article never published, or an
article published in other periodicals.” Id. at 824 n.14. The credibility and value that an article
gains from being published in a noteworthy publication is retained in the electronic publications due
to the print publisher’s selection. Id.
78. Id. at 825.
79. Tasini v. New York Times Co., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 841, 843 (1997) (discussing how
plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, raising a number of objections to the district court’s
approach in its opinion). First, plaintiffs argue that the court should have ruled for the freelance
author because the court rejected Time Inc.’s claim that it had acquired electronic rights via one of
the contract. Id. The district court clarified that simply because a freelancer did not contract away
his electronic rights, this fact does not impact the publisher’s privilege to reproduce revisions of
their periodicals, absent an express transfer of rights. Id. at 845 Second, plaintiffs argue that under
the court’s interpretation of § 201(c), there remains a disputed question of fact as to whether any of
the electronic technologies involved in this case qualify as permissible revisions. Id. at 843. The
court restated the established fact that selection was preserved and that all of the print articles were
included in the databases therefore making the print and electronic publications substantially similar
as a matter of law. Id. at 849. Finally, plaintiffs argue that the court mistakenly didn’t seriously
consider plaintiff’s infringement claim arising from abstracts of the freelance articles in GPO. Id. at
843. The court noted the text-based NEXIS and NYTO both qualified as revisions, therefore textbased abstracts in GPO are also permissible revisions of the original work. Id. at 851.
80. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 172 (discussing the same). The authors argued on appeal that § 201(c) only allowed
publishers to include their works in the original collective work and does not allow individually
copyrighted works to be included in one or more electronic databases. Id. at 165. The authors also
argued that the publisher’s privilege under § 201(c) is not transferable to the electronic publishers.
Id. The Second Circuit held that § 201(c) does not permit publishers to license individually
copyrighted works for inclusion in electronic databases. Id. Consequently, the court did not
address whether the privilege was transferable under § 201(d). Id.
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copyrightable aspects of the publisher’s collective works.82 The court
concentrated on how the enormous electronic databases engulfed the
individual articles and periodicals.83 The Second Circuit found the
databases were primarily used to provide the end users with access to
“the preexisting materials that belong to the individual author.”84 The
court noted “§201(c) would not permit a Publisher to sell a hard copy of
an Author’s article directly to the public even if the Publisher also
offered for individual sale all of the other articles from the particular
edition. We see nothing in the revision provision that would allow the
Publishers to achieve the same goal indirectly through NEXIS.”85
Additionally, the Second Circuit addressed the parties’
interpretation of the term “revision.”86 The court reasoned that since
§201(c) was adopted to end “indivisibility”87 and preserve an author’s
rights in his contributions, the defendants’ overly broad reading of the
term “revision” “would cause the exception to swallow the rule.”88 The
82. Id. at 168 (discussing the same). Some of the paper’s content and most of the paper’s
arrangement are lost when a particular edition of a magazine or newspaper is placed in an electronic
database. Id. at 169. It is actually difficult for the users of the databases to reconstruct the original
periodical or collect all of the articles from a particular edition. Id. In fact, The New York Times
forbids NEXIS from producing “facsimile reproductions” of particular editions. See Tasini, 533
U.S. 483 (2001).
83. Tasini, 206 F.3d at 168 (stating “NEXIS is a database comprising thousands or millions of
individually retrievable articles taken from hundreds or thousands of periodicals. It can hardly be
deemed a ‘revision’ of each and every edition of every periodical that it contains”).
84. Id. at 169 (discussing the same). Section 201(c) and § 103(b) provide that the author of
the individual contribution retains all rights in his work, and may sue for infringement of that work.
Id.
85. Id. at 168.
86. Id. at 167, citing Exch. Comm’n v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (noting
that proper statutory construction mandates that particular phrases be interpreted in context).
Applying this rule to § 201(c), the court found:
The first clause sets the floor so to speak, of the presumptive privilege: the author of the
collective work is permitted to reproduce and distribute individual contributions as part
of “that particular collective work.” In this context ‘that particular collective work
means a specific edition or issue of a periodical. The second clause expands on this, to
permit the reproduction and distribution of the individual contribution as part of a
“revision” of “that collective work,” i.e., a revision of a particular edition of a specific
periodical. Finally, the third clause sets the outer limit or ceiling on what the publisher
may do; it permits the reproduction and distribution of the individual contribution as part
of a “later collective work in the same series,” such as a new edition of a dictionary or
encyclopedia.
Id. at 167; 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
87. See supra notes 50-51 for a discussion of the “Doctrine of Indivisibility.”
88. Tasini, 206 F.3d at 168, citing Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (when a
statute sets forth exceptions to a general rule, we generally construe the exceptions “narrowly in
order to preserve the primary operation of the provision”).Section 201(c) was a key player in
eradicating the doctrine of indivisibility in the Copyright Act by explicitly stating that absent and
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court also noted the publisher’s interpretation conflicted with accepted
canons of statutory construction by failing to construe §201(c) in such a
manner so as to give meaning to each of its parts.89 Consequently, the
Second Circuit adopted a more narrow definition of “revision” and held
the electronic databases were not permissible “revisions” of the
individual periodicals.90
D. The United States Supreme Court91
The Supreme Court, with a seven justice majority, affirmed the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision holding the freelance articles
republished in the electronic databases are not “part of”, nor “revisions
of”, the print periodicals, and therefore cannot be re-licensed without the
author’s consent.92
The Supreme Court rejected the publisher’s argument that the
databases are “revisions” because the articles are individually retrieved
and individually displayed to the user absent their original context.93
express transfer of rights, the authors retain all rights to their contributions placed in collective
works. Id. The second sentence of § 201(c) sets out the three exceptions to this general rule. See
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994). Therefore, the court held that they should narrowly construe the
exceptions so as to “preserve the primary operation of the provision,” to preserve the author’s rights
in their contributions to collective works. Clark, 489 U.S. at 739; Tasini, 206 F.3d at 168.
89. Id. at 167. First, the court reasoned that if the contents of an electronic database are
revisions of the collective work, then the last clause of § 201(c), allowing the reproduction of
individual works “as part of a later collective work in the same series” would be superfluous. Id.,
citing Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448 (1998). An electronic database contains thousands of
editions from hundreds of periodicals; to view the contents of this database as a revision of each of
those editions would eliminate any need for a privilege for “a later collective work in the same
series.” Id. at 167. Rather, the court interpreted § 201(c)’s three privileges as the floor, middle, and
ceiling of publishers’ rights. See supra note 86.
90. See supra notes 81-89. Additionally, the court relied on legislative history that noted the
“revision” and “later collective work in the same series” clauses of § 201(c) were not intended to
permit the inclusion of previously published freelance contributions “in a new anthology or an
entirely different magazine or other collective work.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 123 (1976). The
court concluded that because each database contained innumerable articles from outside publishers
and/or editions, the databases were “at best a new anthology of innumerable editions . . . and at
worst a new anthology of innumerable articles from these editions.” Tasini, 206 F.3d at 167.
91. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
92. Id. at 493.
93. Id. at 499-500. Copyright is very concerned with perception as is evidenced in the
fixation requirement (“a work is fixed . . . when its embodiment . . . permit[s] it to be
perceived . . .”), and the definition of copyrightable subject matter (“original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium . . . from which they can be perceived . . .”). Alice Haemmerli,
Symposium on Electronic Rights in International Perspective, Commentary: Tasini v. New York
Times Co., 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 142-43 (1998); See also, Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499
(focusing on perception of the user to determine if electronic database is a revision). Consequently,
the Court gave great weight to the manner in which the common user was able to perceive the
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The Court stated, “it would scarcely preserve the author’s copyright in a
contribution if a newspaper or magazine publisher were permitted to
reproduce or distribute copies of the author’s contribution in isolation.”94
The Court also rejected the publisher’s claim that “media neutrality”
allowed the transfer of freelance articles into the electronic databases.95
The Court’s reasoning distinguished the transfer of newspapers to
microfiche, a permissible revision, from the transfer to electronic
databases because microfiche converts the original periodicals into the
new media intact, while the databases strip the articles of their original
context.96 Lastly, the Court dismissed the publishers’ policy argument
that finding for the freelance authors would leave “gaping holes in the
electronic record of history” when unauthorized articles were deleted
from the databases.97 The Court noted this speculative prediction was
freelance articles. Id. The Court found the databases “present articles to users clear of the context
provided either by the original periodical or by any revision of those editions,” because database
“searches” retrieved articles as individual results, and displayed them without the graphics,
formatting, or other articles with which the article was initially published. Id. at 500. The GPO
CD-ROM presented the articles in context as a visual image of the original page, but the database
still lacked all of the other material and formatting from surrounding pages of the original
periodical. Id. At best, the databases were new collective works made up of thousands of
individual editions, each of which makes up only a tiny portion of the larger work. Id. From
another point of view, the articles are not “part of” a larger work at all, but stand as individual
works, presented individually. Id. Therefore the individual articles were not reproduced and
distributed “as part of” either the original edition or a revision of that edition. Id.
94. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497; see Gordon, supra note 48, at 484-485. The Court noted the
Copyright Act “adjusts a publisher’s copyright in its collective work to accommodate a freelancer’s
copyright in her contribution. If there is demand for a freelance article standing alone or in a new
collection, the Copyright Act allows the freelancer to benefit from that demand.” Tasini, 533 U.S.
at 497. The Court disregarded the significance of the identifying “tags” that cited the source of
origin because they merely suggest the articles were previously part of that periodical, and do not
mean the articles are currently part of that periodical. Id. Thus, the databases impermissibly
reproduced and distributed the articles individually. Id. at 500.
95. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502. The concept of media neutrality is based in Copyright Act’s §
102(a) that grants copyright protection to original works “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.” Id. The transfer of a work between media does not alter the character of that work for
copyright purposes. Id. However, the Court held the transfer to electronic databases does not
represent a mere conversion of intact periodical from one medium to another like microfiche. Id.
96. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502. Microfilm and microfiche contain continuous photographic
reproductions of a periodical in the medium of miniaturized film whereby the articles appear in
precisely the same position as in the original periodical, both on the page and within the larger
periodical as a whole. Id. Although microfilm rolls contain numerous editions (like the databases)
and the user can focus on just one article (like the databases), the microfilm distinguishes itself by
presenting the articles in their original context of the periodical as a whole. Id. On the other hand,
NEXIS and NYTO individually present the articles disconnected from the rest of the page and from
the rest of the edition. Id. GPO presents the articles within the context of the page, but
disconnected from surrounding pages, the rest of the Sunday Magazine, and the rest of the
newspaper. Id. at 501.
97. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505. The publishers and Dissent argue that it will be both difficult and
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not a foregone conclusion, and policy considerations such as these are
better suited for Congressional lawmaking.98 The Court remanded the
remedies issue back to the district court for hearing and decision.99
The majority concluded that the databases did not constitute
Therefore, the electronic publishers
revisions under §201(c).100
infringed the freelance authors’ copyrights by reproducing the articles in
the databases, and the print publishers infringed the authors’ copyrights
by authorizing the electronic publishers to do so.101
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Defining “Revision”
Tasini gave the courts an opportunity, once again, to try their hand
at interpreting the notoriously imprecise language of a federal statute.102
costly for the print and electronic publishers to locate and contract with each individual author of
the numerous freelance articles in the databases. Id. at 520. Without express authorization, the
publishers are left vulnerable to potential statutory damages for infringement. Id. Publishers may
find it more economically feasible to purge their databases of all existing freelance articles and
demand a complete transfer of copyright in future freelance articles. Id. Consequently, the
freelancers would be in the same unfair position as before the 1976 Copyright Act where they lost
the copyright to contributions to collective works. Id. Further, the wholesale deletion of freelance
articles defeats the underlying benefits that electronic databases provide to society: efficiency,
accuracy and comprehensiveness. Id. This threat, if realized, would defeat copyright law’s basic
purpose of promoting the general welfare through access to new works. Id.
98. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505-06. “Speculation about future harms is no basis for this Court to
shrink the authorial rights congress has established in § 201(c).” Id. The Court reassured the parties
that, “it hardly follows from today’s decision that an injunction against the inclusion of these
articles in the databases (much less all freelance articles in any databases) must issue.” Id. at 505,
citing 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994) (a court may enjoin infringement); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (goals of copyright law are “not always best served by automatically
granting injunctive relief”). The Court speculated that the parties may enter into blanket licensing
agreements that would enable the publishers to continue using the works while the authors are
compensated for the use of the works. Id. at 505; see, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1979) (discussing blanket licensing and consent decrees).
Further the Court pointed out that numerous other nations, applying their own copyright laws,
concluded electronic database reproduction and distribution of freelance works violate copyrights of
the freelancers. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506, citing Union Syndicale des Journalistes Franais v. SDV
Plurimdia (T.G.I., Strasbourg, Fr., Feb. 3, 1998), in Lodging of International Federation of
Journalism as Amicus Curiae; S.C.R.L. Cent. Station v. Ass’n Generale des Journalistes
Professionnels de Beligique (CA, Brussels, Belg., 9e ch., Oct. 28, 1997), transl. and ed. in 22
COLUM.-V.L.A. J.L. & ARTS 177, 195 (1998); Heg v. De Volkskrant B.V. (Dist. Ct., Amsterdam,
Neth., Sept. 24, 1997), transl. and ed. in 22 COLUM.-V.L.A. J.L. & ARTS 177, 181.
99. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2002).
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Tasini rested on how the Court chose
to define “revision” as found in §201(c) of the Copyright Act.103 Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the majority, used Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary to define “revision” as “a new ‘version,’ and a
version is, in this setting, a ‘distinct form of something regarded by its
creators or others as one work.’”104 Each court that examined this issue
agreed that a revision is inherently different from the original work; but
each also agreed it must still be recognizable as a version of the original
work.105
The Supreme Court’s inquiry into whether the articles were
republished as “part of” a “‘revision’. . . focus[ed] on the Articles as
presented to, and perceptible by, the user of the Databases.”106 The
Court repeatedly struck down the publishers’ arguments with the same
dual edged sword: “. . .the user sees the article clear of the context
provided by the original periodical edition or any revision. . .” and, “. . .
the databases do not perceptibly reproduce articles as ‘part of’ the
collective work. . . or as part of any ‘revision’ thereof.”107 Thus, the
103. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (“In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights
under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the
privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular work, any
revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.”) (emphasis
added). Supreme Court also looked to the legislative history of the 1976 Act that indicated the
owner of the preexisting work would continue to have the right to sue for infringement even after
that work was incorporated into a derivative or collective work. Smith, supra note 42, at 1104,
citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
104. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500, citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1944, 2545 (1976).
105. See Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; Tasini v. New York Times, Co., 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999);
Tasini v. New York Times, Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Greenberg v. National
Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001). A “revision” can be quite different from the
original but must still be recognizable as a version of a preexisting collective work to be fairly
called a revision of “that collective work.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(c); see Tasini, 972 F. Supp at 820. If
the alleged revision is not recognizable as a version of the original, it is inherently a completely new
work. See Id. This new work would not be protected under the § 201(c) “revision” privilege
because the legislative history of the 1976 Act clearly states, a “publishing company could reprint a
contribution form one issue in a later issue of its magazine and could reprint an article from a 1980
edition of an encyclopedia in a 1990 revision of it; the publisher could not revise the contribution
itself or include it in a new anthology or an entirely different magazine or other collective work.”
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122-123 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5738.
106. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499, citing 17 U.S.C. § 102 (stating copyright protection exists in
original works fixed in any medium “from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated”); § 101 (defining “copies” as material objects in which a work is fixed from which
the work can be perceived, and “fixed” as sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived). See also Alice Haemmerli, Symposium on Electronic Rights in International
Perspective, Commentary: Tasini v. New York Times Co., 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129
(1998) (noting Court’s focus on perception in interpreting 1976 Act).
107. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499-500. The Court summarily concluded that the articles were
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Court concluded the databases were not recognizable versions of the
original periodical editions.108
Although the Supreme Court ultimately reached a just decision
using context and perception as a standard, it failed to adequately
address the real issue: What qualifies as a “revision,” or rather when is a
work a recognizable version of the original?109 Following the Court’s
analysis, if an article is presented in context, it is a revision; if it is not
presented in context, then it is not a revision.110 However, presentation
and arrangement are not the sole defining characteristics of a collective
work.111
In Feist, the Supreme Court held that the selection,
arrangement, and coordination of the underlying components make a
collective work unique and recognizable.112 A court should look to a
collective work’s selection, arrangement, and coordination when
determining whether the work is a recognizable “revision” of the
original periodical.113 Therefore, a database may be deemed a “revision”
if it retains recognizable selection, recognizable arrangement, or
neither “part of” the original work, nor “part of” a “revision” of the original work because they are
presented to the users “clear of the context provided by the original periodical editions or by any
revision of those editions.” Id. The Court used lack of context to strike down the publisher’s
argument that the databases were “revisions” of the original periodical, and the publisher’s
argument that the databases were akin to microfiche, which is a permissible use under the doctrine
of media neutrality. Id.
108. See id.; see text supra Part III.D.
109. See Tasini, 533 U.S. 483.
110. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499-500.
111. See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (holding compilations
of fact are copyrightable, but a telephone directory, arranged in traditional alphabetical order, was
not copyrightable due to lack of minimal creative spark required for compilation copyright). The
Court reasoned that a compilation is not copyrightable per se, but is copyrightable only if the
underlying components have been “selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” Id. at 356, citing 17 U.S.C. §
101.
112. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. See also, Bell South Advertising & Pub. Corp. v. Donnelley Info.
Pub. Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding BAPCO’s selection of headings and arrangement
of business listings under those headings made the yellow pages sufficiently original), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1101 (1994); Key Pub., Inc. v. Chinatown Today Pub. Enterprises, 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding Key directory is original because of the selection of businesses to include and the
arrangement of the listings under unique headings); Paula Baron, Back to the Future: Learning
From the Past in the Database Debate, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 879, 879 (2001) (discussing “pre-modern”
copyright cases protection of databases).
113. See Tasini v. New York Times Co, 972 F. Supp. 804, 820 (1997). Publishers are not
allowed to revise the freelance authors contributions to the collective work, so the only parts of a
collective work that can be “revised” are the elements of selection, coordination, and arrangement
that the collective authors contributed to make it original. Id. It is this original contribution that
gives a collective work its unique character, which makes it identifiable as “that collective work.”
Id. Thus to determine whether something is a revision, one should look to the original contributions
of the author. Id.
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recognizable coordination.114
The Tasini Court admittedly focused on the arrangement and
presentation of the articles to database users.115 The Court correctly
found that the electronic databases do not contain any recognizable
arrangement from the periodicals.116 Based on this fact, the Court
summarily declared that the databases were not recognizable revisions
under §201(c).117 However, the Court’s analysis overlooked the
publisher’s selection, only looking at the arrangement and coordination
of the electronic databases through “context.”118 As a result of this leap
in reasoning, the Court ignores the very real possibility that selection
alone may render a database a recognizable “revision” of a print
periodical.119
114. See supra notes 112-13; Key Pub., 945 F.2d at 513 (stating compilation only needs
original selection, coordination, “or” arrangement); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining compilation as a
work formed by assembling preexisting materials that are selected, coordinated, “or” arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work).
115. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499 (‘[W]e focus on the Articles as presented to, and perceptible by,
the user of the Databases.”).
116. Id. at 500. “When a user conducts a search, each article appears as a separate item within
the search result.” Id. Articles also appear without graphics, formatting, or other articles with
which the article was initially published. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id.; Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 142 (“Because the arrangement of the publishers’
works is completely lost in the Lexis/Nexis context, the sole issue with regard to Lexis/Nexis is
whether the selection of the component parts is recognizable online, thereby qualifying the
electronic publication as a ‘revision’ of the collective work.”); Dixon, supra note 6, at n.47 (district
court never acknowledged that NEXIS contains thousands of articles never selected by the
publishers of the New York Times); Hicks, supra note 42, at 1006 (noting it is unfortunate that
subjective selection receives limited application).
119. Ethan R. York, Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp.: Continuing the Stable
Uncertainty of Copyright in Factual Compilations, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565, 584 (1999)
(noting originality must be found in the compilers selection or arrangement; there need not be
originality found in each aspect of the work); Hicks, supra note 42, at 1025 (“Once a court uncovers
elements of a databases that reflect subjectivity in their selection, copyright protection follows,
regardless of their arrangement or location.”). See also, Russell G. Nelson, Seeking Refuge From A
Technology Storm: The Current Status of Database Protection Legislation After the Sinking of the
Collections of Information Anti-Piracy Act and the Second Circuit Affirmation of Matthew Bender
& Co. v. West Publishing Co., 6 J. INTELL. PROP L. 453 (1999) (discussing copyright originality in
compilations). Although arrangement and coordination are lost, there is no compelling reason why
a collection of digital files corresponding to a single edition of the New York Times, standing alone
cannot constitute a “revision” of that day’s New York Times because selection is retained. See
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For example, should the New York Times be
forbidden from selling a CD-ROM that contains just today’s paper to customers who want to read
the Times on their computer? See id. This CD-ROM may have a search function to take John Doe
directly to the sports scores, and would likely present the articles individually, clear of the context
of the rest of the paper, yet, is this CD-ROM anything less than the February 11, 2002 New York
Times in a new format? See id. The CD-ROM is, in the Supreme Court’s own words, “a new
‘version,’ and a version is, in this setting, a ‘distinct form of something regarded by its creators or
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Unfortunately for the publishers, utilizing selection, in addition to
arrangement, as a basis for recognizing a work as a revision does not
change the results of this case.120 The New York Times is independently
recognized for its selection of articles.121 However, the Court should
have examined each database’s subjective selection to see if it was
similar to the New York Times’ selection, thus rendering the database a
recognizable revision.122
1. NEXIS
The subjective selection that goes into NEXIS is fundamentally
different from the selection made by the New York Times publishers.123
The Times publishers decide which articles will be included in “All the
News That’s Fit to Print.”124 On the other hand, the NEXIS publishers
are choosing which periodicals will be included in their database.125
Once the NEXIS publishers decide to include the New York Times in
their database, the inclusion of the individual articles is no longer an
original defining characteristic because NEXIS is merely trying to be as
comprehensive as possible.126 Therefore, NEXIS’ selection of whole
others as one work.’” Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500.
120. See text infra Part IV.A.1-3; Hicks, supra note 42, at 1006 (recognizing that subjective
selection typically extends only to small compilations because of the selectivity that goes into
“winnowing” a potentially large compilation down into a smaller one).
121. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 515 (Stevens, J. Dissenting), citing Tasini v. New York Times, Co.,
975 F. Supp. 804, 823 (1993) (“The New York Times perhaps even represents the paradigm, the
epitome of a publication in which selection alone reflects sufficient originality to merit copyright
protection.”).
122. See Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 143 (arguing selection is not preserved in NEXIS
because the user must take proactive steps to recreate an edition before it is in fact recognizable as
the same selection); Greenberg v. National Geographic Society, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001)
(comparing electronic magazine archive to original magazine); Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (comparing
third party electronic databases with print periodicals); Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (applying § 201(c) revision privilege to copying of individual articles).
123. See Hicks, supra note 42, at 1025. Copyright for a compilation may be based on the
author’s subjective selection of preexisting material. Id. However, the contents of many databases
may not reflect the necessary creative subjectivity because the data is amassed based on objective
criteria that are not creative enough to reveal originality. See id. Most compilations are defined by
their comprehensiveness and usually contain selections based on objective, not subjective criteria.
Id. at 1006. However, even large compilations may reflect subjectivity in decisions made in their
creation. Id. (arguing large compilations should be given equal protection under subjective
selection doctrine as small compilations).
124. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 515 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting importance of New York
Times selection process).
125. See Hicks, supra note 42, at 1025 (“Courts should scrutinize carefully the components of
the databases, isolating those elements that reflect particular judgmental decisions by the database
author from those elements that are purely objective and noncreative.”).
126. See Hicks, supra note 42, at 1025 (arguing that because the nature of a database system
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periodicals is not recognizable as the same selection the New York
Times makes because NEXIS is not making any subjective selection of
particular articles.127 Conversely, the New York Times is not making
any subjective selection of other periodical titles to include in the
Times.128 Therefore, the subjective selection that goes into NEXIS is not
recognizable as the same subjective selection that goes into a particular
edition of the New York Times.129
2. General Periodicals OnDisc CD-ROM (GPO)
As previously noted, the New York Times is defined by its
subjective selection of individual articles for a particular day’s paper.130
GPO, on the other hand, is defined by its selection of general
periodicals, including the New York Times’ Sunday Book Review and
Magazine.131 Like NEXIS, once GPO makes the decision to include a
periodical, it wants all of the articles in that periodical so that its
makes the most comprehensive systems the most useful, the subjective selection doctrine will not
give the database originality). See also, Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499
U.S. 340 (1991) (holding phone company did not make subjective selection by including all of its
“subscribers” in its phone book). If including all of something is an objective selection, then
NEXIS’ inclusion of all of the New York Times articles is an objective selection. See id.
Consequently, the New York Times’ subjective selection is not preserved in the electronic database.
See id. Contra Tasini, 533 U.S. at 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing New York Times’ selection
is preserved by NEXIS database).
127. See supra note 126; Feist, 499 U.S. at 349; Sims, supra note 53, at 9. The New York
Times’ contracts with the electronic databases were licenses to publish the complete text of
newspaper and magazine editions. Sims, supra note 53, at 9. The publishers delivered each
edition’s text to the databases as electronic files that would be uploaded into the database. Id. The
database wanted the complete text and its contracts mirrored this desire. Id.
128. See id. The New York Times was fully aware that its periodicals were going to be
included in a database that contained numerous other periodicals. Id. The Times’ was primarily
concerned with its contractual duty to send the text of the daily edition to the databases, and the
databases’ payment for such a license. Id.
129. See supra notes 120-28 (discussing importance of selection as a defining characteristic).
Users reference particular works because of the publisher’s subjective selection. Cf. Haemmerli,
supra note 93, at 142-43 (noting perception of the user is important in determining recognizability
of a work as a revision). A user searches NEXIS because of the numerous reputable periodicals the
NEXIS publishers select to include in its database. Id. On the other hand, a user reads the New
York Times for the articles that are selected by its renowned editors. Id. A user is drawn to NEXIS
because of the periodicals it selects, and the user is drawn to the New York Times because of the
articles it selects. Id. The respective publisher’s selection is an integral part of how the work is
perceived. Id. The 1976 Act includes perception as an important part of copyright protection. Id.
at 143. This is seen in the Act’s requirement that a work be “fixed” such that it can be perceived;
and the defining of copyrightable subject matter as, “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium from which they can be perceived.” Id., citing 17 U.S.C. § 101(defining fixation
requirement); 17 U.S.C. § 102 (defining copyrightable subject matter).
130. See supra notes 120-29 (discussing importance of selection as a defining characteristic).
131. Id.
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database will be comprehensive.132 Users are drawn to GPO because of
the diverse periodicals it selects to include in the database, but users read
the New York Times for the articles selected.133 The subjective
selection made by GPO is not recognizable as the subjective selection
made for a particular edition of the New York Times.134
3. New York Times OnDisc (NYTO)
NYTO’s only subjective selection was picking its topic as the New
York Times.135 Once UMI decided to publish a CD-ROM of the New
York Times, they did not subjectively select articles to include in its
database; rather they merely wanted to compile every New York Times
article to make their database comprehensive.136 NYTO’s subjective
selection is not recognizable as the same subjective selection made for
an issue of the New York Times.137
Consequently, even using subjective selection as an additional
foothold for finding a subsequent work to be a revision, each of the three
databases fail to be recognizable versions of the original New York
Times.138
B. Microfiche and Media Neutrality
The publishers attempted to analogize the electronic databases to
microfilm or microfiche, a permissible adaptation of print periodicals.139
NEXIS and GPO are easily distinguished from microfiche because the
databases include material from numerous sources while microfiche is
usually seen as an archive of a single periodical.140 NYTO, on the other
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 120-29 (discussing importance of selection as a defining characteristic).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See text and notes supra Part IV.A.1-3.
139. See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 500 (2001). Microfiche is an
acceptable use or modification of a work because the 1976 Act is intended to maintain media
neutrality. Michael A. Forhan, Tasini v. New York Times: The Write Stuff For Copyright Law?, 27
CAP. U.L. REV. 863, 878 (1999). The legislative history of the 1976 Act shows that Congress
wanted to extend copyright to new media. Id. An example of media neutrality in the 1976 Act is its
“defining of ‘copies’ to include ‘any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.’” Id., citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies”).
140. See Hur, supra note 35, at 87 n.218 (arguing NEXIS cannot be a revision because articles
do not have to be retrieved with other articles from that particular edition). In fact, the New York
Times actually forbids NEXIS from producing “facsimile reproductions of the particular editions.”
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hand, is more easily viewed as resembling microfiche because both
contain past editions of a single periodical.141
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Copyright Act embodies
the concept of media neutrality; “that the transfer of a work between
media does not alter the character of that work for copyright
purposes.”142 However, the Court rejected the microfiche analogy
because “unlike the conversion of newsprint to microfilm, the transfer of
articles to the Databases does not represent a mere conversion of intact
periodicals (or revisions of periodicals) from one medium to another.”143
The Court went on to reject the publisher’s argument that these
differences were necessitated by the medium.144 However, in a world of
emerging digital technology, the Court dismissed the concept of media
neutrality too quickly.145 A computer file containing the entire text of
Id. at 90 n.253, citing Tasini v. New York Times, Co. 206 F.3d 161, 169 (1999).
141. See Hur, supra note 35, at 87 n.219 (stating UMI database, NYTO, presents a more
difficult issue than NEXIS because it only contains articles from one publisher). NYTO is “akin to
an anthology of all editions of the New York Times.” Id. However, NYTO cannot be a revision
because a new anthology would be a new collective work that exceeds the scope of the § 201(c)
privilege. Id. The § 201(c) privilege is limited to “revisions” of “that collective work,” not entirely
new collective works or anthologies. Id. See also, Kia L. Freeman, Tasini v. New York Times:
Wrong Issue, Wrong Presumption, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 841 (1999) (arguing the district court
missed the issue in its decision by asking if the databases were substantially similar to the original
collective work, while the proper issue was: in light of the original contributions of the author to the
collective work, is the underlying work being used in a revision of that collective work or in an
entirely different collective work; and concluding CD-ROMs are revisions, but NEXIS is not).
142. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502. See also, Deborah Tussey, The Creative Enemy of the True: The
Meaning of Originality in the Matthew Bender Cases, 5 RICH. L.J. & TECH. 10, at n.75 (1999)
(“discussing how Congress intentionally drafted the definition of “copies” to avoid technology
specific readings of the [copyright] statute and achieve media neutrality.”); Matthew Bender & Co.
v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing media neutrality in context of online
databases); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing
media neutrality while denying copyright protection for pagination of West reporters); Sims, supra
note 53, at 14 (“media-neutrality. . . seems to require that § 201(c) be construed either to allow
publishers to make whatever is available on paper and in microfilm available in electronic media as
well, or to compel them to halt and purge even the microfilm republication of their works.”).
143. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502; see also, Brief for Amici Curiae American Intell. Prop. Law
Assoc., at 2001 WL 22982, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201)
(arguing, in support of neither party, that mere conversion of a collective work from one medium to
another is a reproduction that is within the rights of a publisher under § 201(c) of the Copyright Act,
however, such a conversion is not a permitted “revision” if each separate contribution is stripped
from the collective work).
144. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502; see Michael A. Forhan, Tasini v. New York Times: The Write
Stuff For Copyright Law?, 27 CAP. U.L. REV. 863, 878 (1999). Publishers argued that the change
in the medium is irrelevant because § 201(c) allows “revisions” without limitation to the nature or
type of revision. See Forhan, supra, at 878.
145. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 511-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sims, supra note 53, at 14
(arguing media-neutrality is fundamental concept of 1976 Act which must be addressed in analysis
of electronic publishing).
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the February 22, 2002 New York Times would be large enough to create
problems on underpowered computers, and long enough to make reader
navigation nearly impossible.146 Therefore, at some point it is
reasonable for electronic publishers to break a larger collective work into
sub-files for logistical reasons.147
Regardless, media neutrality does not justify a publisher’s selling of
articles individually, separate from the rest of the collective work.148
The proper way to create an electronic “revision” of a work would be to
place an entire pages worth of articles in one file, and provide links to
“flip” to the next page or section of the collective work.149
C. Transferability of §201(c) privilege
The Supreme Court did not address the transferability of the
§201(c) privilege because it found that the electronic databases were not
revisions of the freelance articles, and thus not part of the privilege in the
first place.150 However, as time passes, print works will continue to be
archived in electronic databases, many of which, with the help of
technological advances, will be deemed “revisions” under §201(c).151
Therefore, it is important to note that the privilege accorded publishers
in §201(c) is amenable to a nontransferable, non-exclusive license.152
146. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 511-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Just as a paper version of the
New York Times is divided into sections and pages in order to facilitate the reader’s navigation and
manipulation of large batches of newsprint, so too the decision to subdivide the electronic version of
that collective work into individual article files facilitates the reader’s use of the electronic
information.”). Id. at 513 n.19 (“An ASCII version of the October 31, 2000, New York Times,
which contains 287 articles, would fill over 500 printed pages.”).
147. See Sims, supra note 53, at 14. It is hypocritical to allow publishers to offer complete
photographic copies of their issues on microfilm, but not allow them to offer text only copies of the
articles, which represent the bulk of the work, in electronic form. Id. Eventually, technology may
allow documents to be presented electronically in a photographic format like microfilm but until
then the medium necessitates the work be broken down into feasible units. Id.
148. See Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (finding infringement of
freelance author’s copyright when defendant, with permission of collective publisher, copied and
sold author’s article separately from the collective work as a whole).
149. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority’s focus on the GPO’s
inability to flip to the next page is nothing more than a criticism of the databases’ medium-driven
need to divide the periodicals into smaller units. Id.
150. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 494 (stating databases are not privileged revisions of the print
periodicals, so “we find it unnecessary to determine whether the privilege is transferable”).
151. See text supra Part IV.B. (“Microfiche and Media Neutrality”). Technological advances
will likely allow electronic databases to be revisions in the future. Id.
152. See Gordon, supra note 48, at 477-48 (interpreting Copyright Act to say, absent a written
agreement, or an employee/employer relationship, the publisher can only obtain a non-exclusive
license to publish which is merely “permission” or a “right” to publish); Haemmerli, supra note 93,
at 137-38 (“[G]iven the doctrinal history of copyright indivisibility and similar doctrine in the

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss3/5

28

Radefeld: New York Times v. Tasini
RADEFELD1.DOC

2003]

5/5/03 12:09 PM

NEW YORK TIMES V. TASINI

573

Section 201 grants a freelance author complete ownership of his
works, and absent evidence of an express transfer of rights, only grants
publishers (collective authors) a limited “privilege” to publish the
author’s work “as part of that particular collective work, any revision of
that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.”153
The term “privilege” is only used three times in the 1976 Act.154 The
canons of statutory construction teach that the same words used in the
same statute should be given the same meaning.155 In §109(d) and
§111(d), “privilege” is used to refer to a non-exclusive license.156
Consequently the “privilege” in §201(c) should be construed as a nonexclusive license.157
By definition, ownership of copyright is not “transferred” by a nonexclusive license.158 Rather, a non-exclusive license merely gives the
adjacent patent field, as well as the revisions to the concept of copyright transfers that were
occurring at the same time as the drafting of Section 201(c), it is more plausible to equate the
privilege with a non-exclusive (and therefore non-transferable) license. . .”).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002). See Gordon, supra note 48, at 491 (discussing transferability
of § 201(c) privilege); Santelli, supra note 21, at 288 (interpreting § 201(c)’s privilege with respect
to collective works, and concluding if only the first sentence was present, the authors would
undoubtedly win; however, the second sentence gives the publishers certain privileges whose scope
has yet to be determined).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (collective author is “presumed to have acquired only the privilege
of reproducing and distributing the contribution. . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (“privileges prescribed by
subsections (a) and (c) do not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, extend to any person who
has acquired possession of the copy or phonorecords”); 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (referring to fee that
must be paid for the “privilege” of re-transmitting conventional television broadcasts).
155. Geoffrey P Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
1179, 1183 (1990) (“The same words used in the same statute should be taken to have the same
meanings.”).
156. Patrick J. O’Connor, On-Line Computer Databases and CD-ROMS are Not the Electronic
Equivalent of Microfilm: Tasini v. New York Times Co., Electronic Revisions, and Individual
Contributions to Collective Works Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 521, 544
(1998). See 17 U.S.C. § 109(d); 17 U.S.C. § 111(d).
157. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 201(c), with 17 U.S.C. § 109(d), and 17 U.S.C. § 111(d). See
Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 135-38. The 1976 revision of the Copyright Act changed § 201(c)
from a transfer of a “right” to a mere “privilege” to publish a contribution in a collective work. Id.
at 136. Courts must decide whether this privilege is a proprietary interest, and thus transferable, or
merely a permit to use the underlying work. Id. at 137. A “privilege” is defined as, “a particular
and peculiar benefit or advantage. . .[which] exempts one from liability which he would otherwise
be required to perform. . .” Id. at 137, citing BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY at 1197 (1990). The use of
the term “privilege” in contradistinction to the “express transfer of proprietary rights” favors
treating the privilege like a non-exclusive license without a proprietary interest. Id. Additionally, §
201(c), which was modified to counteract the doctrine of indivisibility, would not give away a
proprietary right without the express assent of the author. Id. Therefore, it is most plausible to
equate the § 201(c) privilege with a non-exclusive, non-transferable license. Id. at 138.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ is an assignment, mortgage,
exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of
the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect,
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licensee permission to use the work.159 Logically, the licensee cannot
transfer a non-exclusive license because he does not technically own
anything.160 A tangible example of this principle is a friend you invite
has permission to come to dinner, but he cannot transfer that privilege to
a random third party.161 Consequently, the publisher of a collective
work cannot transfer his §201(c) privilege to a third party electronic
publisher.162
In Tasini, the “transferability” issue renders the electronic databases
infringements regardless of the Court’s decision on the “revision”
issue.163 The publishers and the courts are therefore destined to
formulate a real world remedy for transferring electronic rights.164
but not including a non-exclusive license.”).
159. See Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 137. The linguistic distinction between the § 201(c)
“privilege” and a “right” is a indicator of the legislative intent to eliminate the doctrine of
indivisibility, which had the effect of involuntarily transferring rights. Id. at 136. The legislative
history shows § 201(c) was labeled a privilege because there should not be a presumption of transfer
of ownership in the absence of an express transfer. Id. Rather Congress only intended to presume a
“privilege” was given to the collective author. Id. If the privilege is a permit to use a work, and not
a proprietary interest, then it is non-transferable. Id. at 137. However, if the privilege carried a
proprietary interest, then it was transferable by the collective author. Id. In light of the legislative
history discouraging the involuntary transfer of a proprietary interest, it is safe to assume the
“privilege” is merely a permit to use the work. Id. Therefore, the § 201(c) “concept of a privilege is
similar to that of a non-exclusive license, which provided permission to use a property free of
liability, but does not convey an ownership interest in that property.” Id.
160. Josh J. May, Intellectual Property Tasini v. New York Times Co., 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J.
13, 24 (2001) (“In copyright law, a non-exclusive license is non-transferable.”). Courts apply §
201(c) to give collective authors some minimal privileges in the absence of an express transfer of
copyright, not to give them exclusive rights for which they did not bargain. Id. at 25. Compare
Wendy J. Gordon, Fine-Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic Distribution and Reproduction, 66
Brooklyn L. Rev. 473, 491 (2000). To hold the § 201(c) privilege completely inalienable would be
overbroad because anytime a publishing company is sold, no § 201(c) privilege would adhere to the
collective works sold with it. Id. If the § 201(c) privilege were completely not transferable, the
buyer of an encyclopedia title could not reprint the encyclopedias because it would be infringing the
underlying author’s reproduction rights. Id. at 492 The logical solution to these absurd results
comes from interpreting “the owner of copyright in the collective work” as a status position, rather
than an individual, so when copyright ownership of the collective work changes hands, the privilege
changes hands as well. Id.
161. See Gordon, supra note 48, at 492. (“Some bare licenses are fully alienable (e.g. a typical
movie ticket), but some are inalienable (e.g. the invitation from one friend to another to ‘drop in
Tuesday night’)”).
162. See Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 138 (arguing doctrine and legislative history support
treating § 201(c) privilege as a non-exclusive license). Contra Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972
F. Supp. 804, (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding § 201(c) privilege a subdivision of a ‘right’ and thus
transferable under § 201(d)), citing 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (“Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be
transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately.”).
163. See text and notes supra Part IV.C. (arguing § 201(c) privilege is not transferable, and
therefore electronic databases are infringements of authors’ copyrights); Tasini, 533 U.S. 483.
164. See Id. at 506 (remanding remedial issues to district court).
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D. Consequences and Solutions for the Future
The Publishers persisted that a finding for the Authors would
“punch gaping holes” in the electronic record of history when electronic
publishers were required to delete unauthorized freelance articles from
their databases.165 However, the Supreme Court said “it hardly follows
from today’s decision that an injunction against the inclusion of these
Articles in the Databases (much less all freelance articles in any
database) must issue.”166 The Court continued by saying the parties
“may enter into an agreement allowing continued electronic
reproduction of the Author’s works; they (sic), and if necessary the
courts and Congress, may draw on numerous models for distributing
copyrighted works and remunerating authors for their distribution.”167
The Court then remanded the remedial issues back to the district court
for initial airing and decision.168
Omission of freelance articles from electronic collections, on any
scale, would undermine the primary benefits that electronic databases
provide researchers and the public.169 However, Congress does not need
to step in immediately to protect public access to freelance works
165. Id. at 504 (majority dismissing publishers policy argument); see also, Brief of Amici
Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. et al. at 2001 WL 22914, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533
U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing that removing freelance articles form internet would be
devastating to the electronic record and impede public access to valuable information).
166. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505, citing 17 USC § 502(a) (court “may” enjoin infringement);
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n.10 (noting goals of copyright law are
“not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief”).
167. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505; see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 118(b); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. System, Inc., 441 U.S 1, 4-6, 10-12 (1979) (recounting history of blanket music licensing
regimes and consent decrees governing their operation). The Court refused to let speculation about
future harms shrink the author’s enumerated rights established by Congress in § 201(c). Tasini, 533
U.S. at 505-06. The Court was reluctant to establish a remedial scheme because “Congress can
determine the nature and scope of the problem and fashion on (sic) appropriate licensing remedy far
more easily than can courts.” Id. at 520 n.18, (Stevens, J., dissenting), citing 17 U.S.C. § 108(d)(1).
After the author’s win in the Second Circuit, Plaintiff Tasini even urged publishers to negotiate
licenses with freelance authors so as to avoid further litigation. Hur, supra note 35, at n.263.
168. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506.
169. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Electronic archives benefit
researchers through efficiency, accuracy, and comprehensiveness. Id. Digital technology offers
society unprecedented access to vast amounts of information in a searchable format. See Atteritano,
supra note 5, at 378; Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Super Highway”:
Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1467 (1995); Sheldon
W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 571
(2001); Dixon, supra note 6, at 127; April M. Major, Copyright Law Tackles Yet Another
Challenge: The Electronic Frontier of the World Wide Web, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
75, 76 (1998); John D. Shuff & Gregory T. Holtz, Copyright Tensions in a Digital Age, 34 AKRON
L. REV. 555, 557 (2001); David J. Loundy, Revision the Copyright Law for Electronic Publishing,
14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 4 (1995).
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because there are alternative, less intrusive solutions to achieve
copyright’s goals.170 Now that the Court has clarified who owns
electronic rights, the parties can individually contract for these rights, or
establish Collective Rights Organizations (CRO).171 If neither of these
less intrusive options is successful in furthering copyright’s primary goal
of promoting the public welfare, then Congress should step in and
establish a compulsory licensing system.172 This Note now examines
170. Freeman, supra note 141, at 875 (discussing appropriate way for copyright law to deal
with novel issues). In the early days of a new issue, it is inappropriate to pass new legislation. Id.
The proper way to discover the boundaries of new rights is through trial and error. Id. First,
interested parties use whatever devices or techniques are available to them, including contractual
arrangements, to stake a claim on the new unregulated right. Id. Then, after interested parties make
the first moves, the law can step in and recognize an official method of control over the new right.
Id., citing Ejan MacKaay, The Economics of Emergent Property Rights on the Internet, in THE
FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 13, 19-21 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed. 1996).
See also, Atteritano, supra note 5, at 405-409 (arguing for the use of contract and collective
societies to solve digital dilemma). Contracting is the “ultimate solution” to the controversy if both
sides are willing to enter into meaningful negotiation and compromise. Id. at 405. The “future
solution” is utilization of “copyright clearing centers,” which will assist in easing the parties’
concerns about straight contracting. Id. at 406. The United Kingdom is a real world example where
these less intrusive solutions proved to be a “thriving industry for the marketing of copyrighted
works.” Forhan, supra note 144, at 882.
171. See Forhan, supra note 144, at 882. Collective rights organizations act as middlemen or
brokers of the copyrighted material. Id. The CRO’s compile individual works and sell licenses to
customers, which permit them to use the work in exchange for a fee. Id. This simplifies the
licensing process while allowing authors to retain a more powerful voice in the control and
dissemination of their works. Id. The National Writer’s Union established the Publication Rights
Clearinghouse (PRC) to administer collective licensing of freelance work, and digitally process
permission payments. See Hur, supra note 35, at 91 n.267. The PRC licenses to publishers and
databases non-exclusive rights to its inventory of articles and books. Id. The PRC enrolls authors
who own the secondary rights to their works and places their works into the PRC inventory. Id.
The entire PRC repertoire is then licensed to publishers, who collect and pay PRC fees for the use of
the PRC author’s works. Id. PRC then distributes this money to its member authors for the use of
their works. Id. See also, Publication Rights Clearinghouse of the National Writers Union,
available at http://www.nwu.org/prc/prchome.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002) (giving details about
Publication Rights Clearinghouse). An alternative organization is the Author’s Registry, established
by the Author’s Guild and The American Society of Journalists and Authors. Jason Williams, Court
Decision for Freelancers Could Leave Gaps in Archives, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Oct. 2, 1999, at 5.
The Author’s Registry locates authors for publishers and will accept, and hold in trust, secondary
use fees from publishers who want to use an author’s work but is having difficulty finding the
author. Id. The Author’s Registry does not license the author’s works. Id.
172. See, e.g., 17. U.S.C. §§ 114-122 (establishing a compulsory licensing system for
distribution and public performance of musical works). Congress could alternatively step in and
amend the 1976 Act to clarify the issue of electronic rights. Smith, supra note 42, at 1124. As seen
in past federal copyright statutes, Congress has acted similarly in the past to resolve inconsistencies
in copyright law. Id. at 1127. “[F]rom its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to significant changes in technology. . . [and] it has been Congress that has fashioned the
new rules that new technology made necessary.” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 430 (1984); see also, Michael A. Forhan, Tasini v. New York Times: The Write Stuff for
Copyright Law?, 27 CAP. U.L. REV. 863, 865-67 (giving brief history of copyright law).
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contracts, CRO’s, and compulsory licensing to see the benefits and
drawbacks of using each method to transfer electronic rights.173
1. Contracts, Licenses, and New-Use Analysis
The holding in Tasini leaves the parties free to modify their rights
through contract.174 Publishers and authors are free to integrate
electronic rights into their future contracts and licenses.175 In fact, many
of the parties already began requiring freelancers to explicitly surrender
the electronic rights to their submissions and some, like the New York
Times, even require contributors to waive their rights retroactively as a
condition for future publication.176 Every publisher will want to include
such a grant of electronic rights in future contracts with freelance
authors because in order for a grant of electronic rights to be effective,
the contract or license must be clear, “in writing, and signed by the
owner of the rights conveyed.”177
173. See text infra Part IV.D.1.-3.
174. See Sara Sadler Nelson, Practical Impact of Supreme Court Ruling on Author/Publisher
Digital Use Concerns, ENT. L. AND FINANCE, Jul. 2001, at 1 (2001) (recognizing publishers can
contractually alter the holding in Tasini). However, the difficulty with contracting around the
holding is retroactive licensing of works already in the databases because publishers would have to
expend substantial resources to track down authors and negotiate licenses with them. Hur, supra
note 35, at 92 n.272; see Dixon, supra note 6, at 149 n.81 (noting freelance authors and publishers
have historically created oral, ambiguous contracts that did not address electronic rights); Hur,
supra note 35, at n.117 (describing contracts between authors and publishers).
175. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Nelson, supra note 174, at 1;
Joanne Benoit Nakos, An Analysis of the Effect of New Technology on the Rights Conveyed by
Copyright License Agreements, 25 CUMB. L REV. 433, 446 (1995).
176. See Hur, supra note 35, at 65. The decision against the publishers resulted in contracts
allowing electronic publication of the author’s works without additional compensation for these
rights. Id. “Some publishers negotiate additional fees with big-name authors. Some publishers
will not sign a contract without electronic rights.” Id. at 68 n.29. “All-rights” contracts are the
norm with many publishers. Id. A freelancer who wants to publish repeatedly with the New York
Times must give the company the privilege to include their article in electronic databases, and must
agree to do so for every article that he ever published with the New York Times. Nelson, supra
note 174, at 1.
177. See Atteritano, supra note 5, at 404. Publishers have begun formalizing their contracts
with freelancers since the Tasini case was filed in 1993. Id. Publishers have also made sure these
new written contracts adequately addressed electronic rights. Id. Publishers have dual motives for
demanding electronic rights in their new contracts: to prevent future litigation, and to get revenue
from the electronic exploitation of their collective works. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (“A transfer
of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of
conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the
rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”). If the grant is an exclusive license or
assignment, it must be a clear expression of the intent of the parties to convey a copyright interest,
in writing, and signed. See Nelson, supra note 119. The author may utilize a non-exclusive license
to grant the publisher permission to use the work digitally, while the author retains all of his
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Contract problems arise when new technologies emerge that were
not explicitly contemplated by the contracting parties.178 Absent a
complete transfer of rights to a work, the contracting parties are left
unsure about who owns the rights to exploit the new use.179 Two
schools of thought have emerged in doing this “New-Use” analysis: the
Bartsch (preferred) approach, and the Cohen (strict) approach.180
The Bartsch court adopted a broad approach that allows a licensee
to pursue any uses that can reasonably be said to fall within the medium
described in the license, including the “ambiguous penumbra” of the
terms.181 This approach is “preferred” because it encourages the
development of new media, thus benefiting society through access to
protected works.182
The Cohen Court adopted a narrower approach that refused to give
licensees the rights to new media that were unforeseeable at the time of

exclusive rights to the work. Id. But see, Smith, supra note 42, at 1107 (pointing out that defendant
publishers often used oral contracts with little or no discussion over rights in the articles).
178. See Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968); Rey v. Lafferty, 990
F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988); SAPC,
Inc. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 921 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1990); Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166 (D.C. 1992); Landon v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp.
450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir (1956); Kirke
La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).
179. See supra note 181; Dixon, supra note 6, at 150 n.85 (discussing effect of new technology
on intellectual property contracts). The 1976 Act does not clearly define the rights of freelance
authors in their works. Forhan, supra note 144, at 864. “This leaves the rights of the authors to be
determined by the terms of their contracts with the publisher (if indeed such a contract exists), or by
judicial interpretation of the extent of the publishers’ rights.” Id.
180. See Sidney A. Rosenweig, Don’t Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright’s New-Use
Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 916-20 (1995),
citing Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 150, and Cohen, 845 F.2d at 851. The Bartsch approach was coined the
“preferred” approach by professor Nimmer. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT §10.10B, at 10-87 to 10-89 (1994) (discussing § 201(c) with respect to licensing).
The Cohen approach was referred to as the “strict” approach because of its strict adherence to
underlying contract principles. Id. See also, Nakos, supra note 175, at 446 (discussing Rey v.
Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993), which utilized the Cohen approach); Atteritano, supra note
5, at 388 (applying preferred and strict approaches to electronic publishing).
181. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155; see Rosenzweig, supra note 180, at 916; Nakos, supra note 175
at 444; Atteritano, supra note 5, at 388.
182. See Rosenzweig, supra note 180, at 918. “Because new media are designed to improve
the quality or facilitate the flow of information in society, efforts to encourage their development
are in the pubic interest.” Id. See also, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984) (acknowledging the benefits of free flow of ideas, information and commerce);
Information Infrastructure Task Force, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Preliminary Draft of the Report of
the Working Group on Intellectual property Rights § IV(5) (July 1994) (“The Copyright Act exists
for the benefit of the public. To fulfill its constitutional purpose, the law should strive to make the
information contained in protected works of authorship freely available.”).
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contracting.183 The court reasoned that it is not fair to hold that the
grantor impliedly gave up his rights when the “medium was ‘completely
unforeseeable and therefore could not possibly have formed part of the
bargain between the parties at the time of the original grant.”184
Neither approach is without flaw, so parties continuously argue that
the theory adopted by a particular court puts one party in an unfair
position, or it defeats the underlying goals of copyright law.185 The
solution for parties negotiating contracts and licenses is a future
technologies clause that addresses “rights in the work now existing, or
which may hereafter come into existence.”186 Inclusion of a future
technologies clause eliminates most of the new-use confusion and can be
dispositive evidence of who owns the future rights to a work.187
However, many authors are hesitant to accept these future technologies
clauses that grant “all rights” to the publisher because they feel forced
into negotiating away rights that have a currently undetermined market
value.188 However, this inherent risk in the transaction is no different
183. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 851; see Rosenzweig, supra note 180, at 919; Nakos, supra note 175,
at 446-47.
184. Rosenzweig, supra note 180, at 919, citing Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st. Cir.
1993); see also, Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (reasoning licensee could not have bargained for rights of
videocassette reproduction before the invention of the videocassette recorder); Kirke La Shelle Co.
v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 15-66 (N.Y. 1933) (holding rights to make movie with sound
were not part of agreement because technology to make motion pictures with sound was not yet
invented at the time of contract).
185. Nakos, supra note 175, at 448 (discussing inherent flaws in both the Bartsch and Cohen
approaches to New-use analysis); see also, Rosenzweig, supra note 180, at 920 (examining Bartsch
and Cohen).
186. Carolina Saez, Enforcing Copyrights in the Age of Multimedia, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 351, 366 (1995). The “now known or hereafter” clause has many adaptations such as
“Author licenses the right to publish this article in all technologies now known or hereafter created”;
or “Author reserves right to publish work in technologies not now known or that hereafter come into
existence.” See id.
187. See Saez, supra note 186, at 366 (noting tremendous impact future technology clauses
have had in U.S. litigation); Cohen, 845 F.2d at 855. But see, Saez, supra note 186, at n.113
(“over-reliance on these clauses should certainly be avoided in the multimedia world of global
markets and a border-less information superhighway. It is entirely possible that these clauses may
actually be unenforceable outside the United States, thus resulting in uneven enforcement of the
clause to the detriment of all those involved in the multimedia venture.”).
188. Saez, supra note 186, at 366; see Dixon, supra note 6, at 130 n.12 (acknowledging print
publications such as newspaper may unwittingly force freelance authors into unfavorable contracts);
Sims, supra note 53, at 15 (“publishers have already begun demanding express written transfers of
online rights from their freelance contributors without marginal increases in payments offered, and
obtaining agreement to those terms. Such demands will only become more prevalent.”). If a
freelance author will not sign the form contract that grants electronic rights to the publisher, the
paper will simply commission the needed articles from another author “clamoring for publication.”
Sims, supra note 53, at 14. Publications have used a “take it or leave it” approach when negotiating
these contracts. Id.; Atteritano, supra note 5, at 405. Contracts that specifically grant the publisher
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than the calculated risk an author assumes when he decides to sell his
work outright.189 Additionally, “both parties may benefit if the future
technology clause has been coupled with a provision specifying that the
artist is to receive an ongoing percentage of the revenue stream
regardless of the media utilized.”190
The problem with individualized contracts and licenses is that they
create the impossible task, which the New York Times faces, of hunting
down thousands of past freelance authors and the immense
administrative expense associated with individually negotiating licenses
with each of them.191 Recognizing this burden, many publishers have
opted to begin mass deletions of freelance articles from the electronic
databases.192 As previously mentioned, the destruction of these
databases defeats the efficiency, accuracy and comprehensiveness that
electronic databases offer researchers and the public.193 Allowing
publishers to delete freelance articles will inevitably reduce the public’s
access to these works, which is contrary to copyright law’s goal of
promoting the public welfare.194 Accordingly, the parties and the courts
“all rights” in a work upset the “symbiotic relationship” between authors and publishers. Shuff,
supra note 8, at 566. Authors and Publishers need each other. Id. They have historically
participated in a give-and-take that efficiently distributes works and fairly compensates authors, but
that balance is upset when publishers suddenly demand “all rights” from the authors. Id. The
authors are suddenly disenfranchised with respect to the dissemination of their works. Id.
189. See Saez, supra note 186, at 366.
190. Id. See Santelli, supra note 21, at 281-282 (arguing that payment contracts are the best
solution because they maintain an incentive to authors by giving them continued income from their
works while giving publishers the right to disseminate the works to the public); Smith, supra note
42, at 1122 (“Other publishers, such as Publishers Weekly and the Nation, have followed Harper’s
lead on sharing royalties with freelancers, while other magazines routinely pay a separate fee for
electronic publishing.”)
191. Jeffery P. Weingart & Jill Westmoreland, Tasini Case May Set Back Freelancers,
Publishers: To Avoid Expense, Publishers May Remove Existing Works From Online Publications,
NAT’L L.J., Oct. 25, 1999, at C3. See May, supra note 160, at 26; Meitus, supra note 10, at 772-73.
192. See Sims, supra note 53, at 15. Publishers are businessmen who will do a cost benefit
analysis and follow the cheaper route regardless of the harm to the public’s access to works. Id.
Publishers prefer deleting the articles rather than “(a) spend the resources necessary to locate
freelance writers of articles written over the past few decades, and (b) spend the resources necessary
to come to acceptable terms with them.” Id.; Tony Mauro, New York Times’ Response to Tasini
Ruling is Inappropriate, Author’s Guild Charges, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, Jul. 2001, at 9 (2001)
(“Within minutes of the decision, New York Times Chairman and Publisher Arthur Sulzberg Jr.
said the company would begin ‘the difficult and sad process of removing significant portions from
its electronic historical archive.’”).
193. See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 520 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Brief of Amici Curiae Ken Burns, et al. at 2001 WL 23641, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533
U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing that a finding in favor of authors will both threaten the
completeness of the electronic archives and decrease access to convenient and cost efficient means
of comprehensive research).
194. May, supra note 160, at 26 (“. . . court. . . worr[ied] that not allowing publishers to
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are searching for more efficient models of licensing works for electronic
use.195
2. Collective Rights Organizations
Collective Rights Organizations (CRO) alleviate the administrative
inefficiency of individually contracting with numerous authors for
secondary rights.196 Writers assign the CRO the right to act as their
agent, and the CRO then offers publishers the non-exclusive right to use
the work for a fee.197 Once the CRO has collected the fee, it distributes
royalties to the author.198 A CRO can efficiently allocate royalties to
freelance writers while keeping the electronic databases intact.199
The problem with CRO’s is getting both sides to participate in the
electronically distribute writers’ copyrighted articles would undermine the policy goal of ‘ensuring
that collective works be marketed and distributed to the public.’”). Not only will the pubic be
injured by the removal of works from the databases, but the public will also suffer injury when
online material decreases in quality. Atteritano, supra note 5, at 405. As publishers utilize “take it
or leave it” contracts, inevitably some authors will “leave it” and the publishers will hire
substandard authors to fill in the void. Id. Consequently, the public will lose access to some
talented authors, and have to endure less talented writers with a “lower quality of work product.”
Id.
195. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506 (remanding remedial issues back to the District Court for the
Southern District of New York); Haemmerli, supra note 93, at 148 (“Most authors want their works
to be distributed, and would willingly agree to license their electronic publication. They simply
want to be compensated for that publication.”); Mauro, supra note 192, at 9 (‘“‘The Supreme Court
didn’t say the Times had to remove the articles, it said it had to pay for them . . . The Court stressed
that these issues could be resolved through licensing systems, such as that operated by the Author’s
Registry.’”).
196. May, supra note 160, at 26-27 (“Commercial copyright transactions require negotiation,
monitoring, and enforcement that can be prohibitively costly for individuals but feasible for a CRO.
CRO’s, which flourish in the presence of new forms of media, devise general rules that replicate
contracting terms between two parties and substantially lower transaction costs.” ).
197. Merges, supra note 175, at 1295. Collective agencies automatically emerge to break a
transactional bottleneck in an industry. Id.
198. See id.; May, supra note 160, at 28. Publication Rights Clearinghouse members typically
get from seventy-five percent to ninety percent of the fees paid to the CRO. Id.
199. Merges, supra note 175, at 1295-96. CRO’s have two distinct advantages over
compulsory licensing by the state. Id. at 1295. First, CRO’s provide “expert tailoring” whereby
knowledgeable industry participants set the rules of exchange. Id. Compulsory licenses, on the
other hand, are uniform and limited in scope by the statute. Id. A CRO’s ability to tailor its
contracts provides an “intermediate level of contract detail, reflecting not only collective industry
expertise but also the need for efficiency in carrying out a high volume of transactions.” Id. at 1296.
The CRO’s allows the contracts to be both flexible and efficient. Id. A CRO’s second advantage is
the ability to be flexible itself, unlike a set in stone statutory compulsory licensing scheme. Id. If
rates need to be adjusted, a CRO can easily make the needed changes. Id. On the other hand, a
compulsory licensing system is subject to “legislative lock-in” where Congress is slow to react to
needed changes, and interested parties can influence Congress not to make the changes. Id. at 1296.
Last, CRO’s allow individual rights holders, rather than the state, to set the standard terms of the
licensing agreements. Id. at 1297.
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licensing scheme.200 First, a CRO must get authors to enroll, which is
becoming easier as freelance authors “realize that without joint action no
compensation would be forthcoming at all.”201 Second, and perhaps
more difficult, is getting publishers to work with CRO’s.202 As noted
earlier, publishers are free to condition initial publication on an express
transfer of electronic rights, thus negating a need to pay a fee to a CRO
for secondary rights.203
Although some publishers have resorted to these guerilla tactics,
other publishers have conceded to the author’s rights, and have begun
bargaining with the Publication Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) a new CRO
aimed at marketing freelance works of authorship.204 Hopefully the
ruling in Tasini will encourage more and more authors to join the PRC,
leaving publishers no choice but to deal with the PRC to get content for
their collective works.205
200. May, supra note 160, at 28. “In order to succeed, the PRC must enroll as many freelance
writers as possible and persuade publishers and databases to comply with its licensing scheme.” Id.
The PRC has signed a deal with Contentville, a large online database, but the PRC, or other CRO’s
must get widespread acceptance before it truly becomes effective. See id.
201. See Merges, supra note 175, at 1293 (arguing that Collective Rights Organizations are the
solution to the conflict between copyright and new technologies).
202. May, supra note 160, at 28. “While these royalty-distributing organizations may provide
part of the solution to using copyright effectively in forwarding the interests of authors, publishers,
and users, they will not accomplish this goal unless authors retain the electronic rights to their
works.” Atteritano, supra note 5, at 408. If the authors sign their rights over to the publishers, the
publishers will have no incentive to negotiate or work with a CRO because they already own the
electronic rights. Id. Authors are advised to contract for electronic rights compensation, or to retain
their electronic rights despite the “all-rights grab” by the publishers. Id. If the authors stick
together, copyright protection itself will “serve to help balance the unequal bargaining positions of
the publisher and the freelance author.” Ryan J. Swingle, Note: Tasini v. New York Times: The
Problem of Unauthorized Secondary Usage of an Author’s Works, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 601, 621
(1998).
203. Freeman, supra note 141, at 876 (commenting that modern publishers routinely require
express transfers of copyright from freelance authors). Many commentators think freelance authors
will be forced to give up their electronic rights because of the publisher’s dominant negotiating
position. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 6, at 154-55; Hoff, supra note 50, at 165; Meitus, supra note
10, at 752; Forhan, supra note 144, at 863 (comparing the current U.S. approach to that of Great
Britain; and concluding the issue will likely be solved by the industry through contracts, rather than
by Congress or the courts, and authors will likely bargain away their rights in order to get
published).
204. See Sims, supra note 53, at 13-14. Some “publishers have begun requiring writers to
transfer electronic rights in the signed writings as a condition to first publication, and databases are
seeking to obtain similar express transfers.” See supra note 203.
205. See Meitus, supra note 10, at 775-76. As a result of the Supreme Court’s pro-author
holding, most authors will undoubtedly affiliate with the PRC or a similar organization. Id. The
PRC has already paid out thousands of dollars in royalty payments to its member authors. Id. The
Court’s holding gives freelance authors greater leverage in getting publishers to abide by the PRC’s
licensing scheme, under the author’s terms. Id. See also, May, supra note 160, at 28 (discussing
merits of authors using Collective Rights Organizations).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss3/5

38

Radefeld: New York Times v. Tasini
RADEFELD1.DOC

2003]

5/5/03 12:09 PM

NEW YORK TIMES V. TASINI

583

3. Compulsory Licensing
If authors and publishers do not embrace the PRC, and if the
inefficiencies of individual contracting encumber the development of
electronic media, Congress may step in and enact a compulsory
licensing scheme.206 Compulsory licensing statutorily requires a
copyright owner to grant a license at an established rate.207 As a result,
publishers can use any work they want in their collective database so
long as they are willing to pay the statutory fee.208 On the other side,
authors are guaranteed at least some compensation for the use of their
work.209
At first glance, compulsory licensing seems to be a viable solution
for the transfer of electronic rights, but it is subject to many criticisms.210
First, there is no clear way to devise a fair pricing schedule for literary
works.211 Second, authors inherently lose control over reproduction and
206. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (setting forth compulsory licensing scheme for the music industry);
Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1213, 1265 (1997);
Merges, supra note 175, at 1295.
207. Corey Field, New Uses and New Percentages: Music Contracts, Royalties, and
Distribution Models in the Digital Millennium, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 289, 295 (2000).
Compulsory licensing is legislation with a statutory mandate that the rights be licensed to all comers
willing to pay the pre-set price. Merges, supra note 175, at 1295. Legislatively mandated licensing
reduces transaction costs in two ways. Id. First, contract terms are predetermined thus reducing and
even eliminating haggling. Id. Second, compulsory licensing may have built in administrative
support that saves parties the cost of record keeping, payment collection, and royalty disbursement.
Id.
208. See Voegtli, supra note 206, at 1264. Collective authors face two main obstacles when
trying to get permission to use an underlying work. Id. First, the collective author must get the
original author’s permission to use the work. Id. Second, the collective author must have sufficient
resources and money to contact the other author, negotiate with the other author, and pay money to
the other author for a license. Id. Compulsory licensing gets rid of the permission obstacle by
statutory mandate, and alleviates the money problem because reducing the transactional costs
associated with negotiating a license. Id.
209. See Merges, supra note 175, at 1295. Although the rights must be licensed to a publisher,
the publisher must pay the pre-set rate. Id. Then the organization or system pays the authors
royalties for the use of their works. Id.
210. See infra text. Compulsory licenses appear to be a compromise that reduces the
transactional costs of licensing intellectual property rights, while preserving most of the economic
advantages that accompany stronger rights. Merges, supra note 175, at 1293. However, rather than
institute a slow government run licensing system, experience in other industries has shown that
participants will establish more efficient private collective rights organizations. Id. at 1295.
Current evidence is already showing that this is happening with the establishment of the Author’s
Registry and the Publication Rights Clearinghouse. See id.
211. Voegtli, supra note 206, at 1264. A statutory fee based on the amount of data taken,
priced out per “bit”, seems fair for an information database because the amount taken directly
correlates to the value of the appropriated information. Id. However, the volume or amount taken
does not accurately represent the value of literary and artistic works. Id. Some of the world’s most
valuable literary works, Keats’ Ode on a Grecian Urn for example, are worth substantially more
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distribution, both exclusive rights under the Copyright Act.212 Third, a
compulsory licensing scheme for electronic rights would require an
effective method of monitoring file transfers.213 This file monitoring
system, combined with an effective pay-per-use system, could be used to
charge the public for simply browsing Internet websites.214 Lastly,
compulsory licensing may decrease the scope of “fair use” on the
Internet by creating an identifiable market for a copyrighted work,
therefore turning the last fair use factor against someone previously
making a fair use of a copyrighted work.215
Although each of the models set forth contain flaws, the system the
parties adopt will inevitably be calculated to promote the public welfare
because the parties adequately represent the competing goals of
copyright law.216 The publishers strenuously advocate expanding their
than a horribly written 700-page novel by an unknown author. See id.
212. See Saez, supra note 186, at 351. A compulsory licensing scheme would be enacted as an
amendment to the Copyright Act, thus making an exception to the author’s exclusive rights. See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording are
limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3), and (6) of section 106, and do not include any
right of performance under section 106(4)”). However, “if every time we can no longer enforce the
exclusive nature of a right. . . if every time we react by creating a remuneration right only, we are
gradually pushing copyright away from its nature as a fundamental right into a type of taxation
system. . . [and] if this continues without reaction, copyright will be dead in 30 years.” Saez, supra
note 186, citing Janet Ibbotson & Nainah Shah, Interactive Multimedia and Electronic Publishing,
COPYRIGHT WORLD, Oct. 1993, at 32.
213. Voegtli, supra note 206, at 1265. Computers are well suited for tracking a work’s use.
Shuff, supra note 8, at 569. Copy protection mechanisms, like those for digital music, could be
imbedded in electronic works to thwart unlawful copying, or to track use. Id. After the work had
been used, a system could solicit an appropriate fee form the user and compensate the author. Id.
Clearinghouse of individual works may created that includes terms for secondary distribution of a
work as well as automatic billing and collection of licensing fees to be paid to the author. Id.
214. Voegtli, supra note 206, at 1265.
215. Id., citing American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding copying of professional journals was not fair use in light of ready market created by
Copyright Clearance Center for remunerating copyright owners for photocopies of their works).
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing four factors that determine fair use as: “(1) the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the market for
or value of the copyrighted work.”).
216. See Dixon, supra note 6, at 144 n.54 (stating copyright law balances an incentive for the
creation of works with ensuring the public and later creators can enjoy and build on those works);
New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (demonstrating publishers and authors fighting
for electronic rights). The balance of author against publisher is analogous to copyright’s balance of
promoting creation through incentives, and promoting free access to copyrighted works. Ryan J.
Swingle, Note: Tasini v. New York Times: The Problem of Unauthorized Secondary Usage of an
Author’s Works, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 601, 612-13 (1998). Having competing viewpoints protects
society against “two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed
their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward
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rights to give the public more access to copyrighted works.217 The
authors strenuously advocate expanding their rights to establish
incentives to create new works.218
of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of the improvements,
nor the progress of the arts be retarded.” Id., citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
217. Brief for Petitioners at 2001 WL 27573, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483
(2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing Congress intended publishers to be able to make their publications
and “any revisions” available to the public; electronic copies are privileged under § 201(c) because
legislative history confirms the breadth of the clause; and reading § 201(c) so as to prevent
electronic publication conflicts with the basic tenets of copyright law, to promote general welfare
through dissemination); Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2001 WL 267401, New York Times Co. v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing electronic copies are revisions of their collective
works because they publish the entire editorial content of the original work; therefore the media
neutral Copyright laws should allow the transfer of works to digital form under the same license);
see also, Brief of Amici Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. et al. at 2001 WL 22914, New York
Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing removal of freelance articles from
internet would be devastating to the electronic record and impede public access to valuable
information); Brief of Amici Curiae Ken Burns et al. at 2001 WL 23641, New York Times Co. v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing that a finding in favor of authors will both
threaten the completeness of the electronic archives and decrease access to convenient and cost
efficient means of comprehensive research; that the focus on end users in determining whether
electronic archives qualify as “revisions” under § 201(c) is inconsistent with the practical realities
inherent in the process of research, as well as the longstanding publishing industry assumptions
regarding the permissibility of traditional analog means of periodical, newspaper, or journal storage
and retrieval); Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Geographic Society at 2001 WL 27568, New
York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing publisher of printed
collective work is entitled to reproduce and distribute that collective work in any medium (or
combination of media) it chooses); Brief of Amici Curiae Software & Information Industry
Association et al. at 2001 WL 27570, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00201) (arguing legislative history does not support Second Circuits interpretation of § 201(c), and
differences between the databases and the original print publications are immaterial as a matter of
law because of media neutrality, because the differences are no different than a printed revision, and
because selection of articles is protected independently from arrangement; arguing it is immaterial
how a third party can search through the materials because this is direct infringement case).
218. Respondent’s Brief at 2001 WL 174956, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483
(2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing § 201(c)’s plain meaning confines scope of publisher’s privilege to
revisions in the same series, not new collective works; that the legislative history supports this plain
meaning; and that narrowly reading § 201(c) to not allow electronic publishing of freelance articles
in databases is consistent with precedent and copyright policy); Brief for Respondents Tasini,
Blakely, Mifflin & Whitford at 2001 WL 177049, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483
(2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing that § 201(c)’s language and legislative history justify a finding that
newspaper publisher’s electronic publishing of freelance articles exceeds the scope of the § 201(c)
privilege); see also, Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Assoc. & Assoc. of Research
Libraries at 2001 WL 173550, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201)
(arguing Copyright Act does not require deletion of works from electronic databases and/or
destruction of CD-ROMs; rather the courts can require payment of fair compensation to authors in
the form of past and continuing royalties while maintaining public access); Brief of Amici Curiae
American Society of Media Photographers, Inc. et al. at 2001 WL 177046, New York Times Co. v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing legislative history of § 201(c) shows it was
intended to protect authors’ copyrights in contributions to collective works and to grant publishers
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V. CONCLUSION
Tasini confirmed Marshall McLuhan’s hypothesis that the medium
is the message.219 Digital technology is going to define the future of our
society and the future of copyright law.220 As technology burgeons, it
will become more common to see entrepreneurs exploiting new
technologies, and authors getting angry because these entrepreneurs are
not sharing the profits from the use of the author’s works.221 Now that
the Supreme Court has ruled that absent an express transfer, authors
retain the electronic rights to their works, both authors and publishers
must decide how they will interact, and how they will transfer new
electronic rights.222 Although each side will be acting in their own self
interest, the system they adopt will inevitably be calculated to achieve
limited rights in those contributions; and that consequences of removing works or requiring
payment of royalties will not be devastating); Brief of Amici Curiae Authors Guild, Inc. et al. at
2001 WL 177047, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing
Second Circuit properly weighed the interests of authors, publishers, researchers and electronic
databases in finding publishers could not place articles in electronic databases without
authorization); Brief of Amici Curiae Ellen Schrecker et al. at 2001 WL 177048, New York Times
Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing historians do not need commercial
electronic databases to research, and copyrights of freelance writers should not be ignored simply to
solve the unrelated problem of neglect of the nation’s archives); Brief of Amicus Curiae
International Federation of Journalists at 2001 WL 173557, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533
U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201) (arguing foreign courts have consistently recognized an author has a
continuing copyright in the electronic publication of her work even though she has agreed to include
her work in a printed collective work, the U.S. Copyright laws should be construed in conformity
with similarly minded laws of other nations unless Congress has dictated otherwise, and the
European experience teaches that ruling in favor of the authors’ electronic rights does not result n
the withdrawal of literary works from the Internet).
219. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see MCLUHAN, supra note 3; Dixon, supra note 6, at 155 n.113
(“the impact of the explosive growth of Cyberspace is difficult to exaggerate”). “There are people
who believe that the computer revolution of this decade represents a fundamental change in society,
one that will rank alongside the great social movements in history.” Dixon, supra note 6, at 155
n.113, citing Paul Keegan, The Digerati!, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 21, 1995, at 38.
220. See Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV.
1395 (1996) (arguing that digital technologies will expand and redefine the scope of copyright law);
Elina Mangassarian, Technological Trends and the Changing Face of International Intellectual
Property Law, INT’L LEGAL PERSP. (2001); Jacqeline Lipton, Copyright in the Digital Age: A
Comparative Survey, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER TECH L.J. 333 (2001); Liz Robinson, Music on the
Internet: An International Copyright Dilemma, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 183 (2000); Michael J.
O’Sullivan, International Copyright: Protection for Copyright Holders in the Internet Age, 13 N.Y.
INT’L L. REV. 1 (2000); Charles S. Sims, Understanding Tasini: The Litigation and its Impact on
New Media Licensing, 601 PLI / PAT 401 (2000) (arguing the basic assumptions of publishers and
freelancers have changed after Tasini, and the industry has to adapt to the evolving “online society”
by recognizing and compensating for newly arising issues).
221. Saez, supra note 186, at 366.
222. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483; see Santelli, supra note 21, at 278; Haemmerli, supra note 93, at
148; Atteritano, supra note 5, at 405; Sims, supra note 53, at 410; Forhan, supra note 144, at 883;
Hur, supra note 35, at 90 n.258; Dixon, supra note 6, at 153 n.104.
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the ultimate goal of copyright: to promote the public welfare through
both incentives to create new works, and public access to these new
works.223
Mark B. Radefeld

223. See Atteritano, supra note 5, at 409. “No solution will satisfy everyone, but if we use the
copyright institutions which already exist to assist in the transition which the publishing industry
must make, and if authors are reasonable in their financial demands, all three parties to copyright
(authors, publishers and users) will enjoy a second helping of the growing financial pie created by
electronic publishing.” Id.
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